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Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons




The countries of Eastern Europe are undergoing the nearly impos-
sible task of attempting to right some of the wrongs brought about by
more than forty years of communist rule and domination. Although
"decommunization"1 has taken different forms in the various countries
involved, there are several core issues that will need to be addressed
by each of these newly formed governments: (1) What should be done
about private property that had been confiscated by communist (and/or
Nazi) authorities?; (2) What does the citizenry have a right to know
about the contents of secret government files?; (3) How, and to what
extent, should government institutions and certain occupations "purge"
themselves of communist influence and personnel?; (4) Under what cir-
cumstances should officials and officers of the former communist re-
gimes be brought to trial?; and finally, (5) How should victims of the
various communist regimes be rehabilitated and what means of resti-
tution, if any, should be offered?
To date, the steps to address these questions have been uncertain,
piecemeal, and halting at best.2 In one East European country after
another, it is not clear who or what is driving decommunization, how
far it will go, or what it is seeking to accomplish. Moreover, there is a
rising concern that, rather than seeking to achieve some measure of
justice or to redress some egregious wrongs from the past, much of
what is passed off as decommunization is little more than an attempt
to find a few convenient scapegoats or the carrying out of personal or
political vendettas.
Nevertheless, many Eastern European countries already have
achieved greater success in coming to terms with the wrongs and hor-
rors of the past than other countries that have made similar efforts.
* Professor of Political Science, Purdue University; Ph.D., University of Michi-
gan, 1985; J.D., Villanova University, 1977.
1. The process of attempting to remove the elements of a formerly repressive
regime has gone under different names, depending on the circumstances involved.
For example, following World War II, Italy went through a period of defascistization.
In the 1970s, Greece pursued a policy of dejuntafication, and so on. The current
undertakings in Eastern Europe have been called both decommunization and
debolshevization.
2. Eastern Europe's Past: The Complexities of Justice, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 21,
1992, at 21.
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There are several reasons for this. For instance, most people in these
Eastern European countries desperately wanted to see the fall and
dismantling of their communist governments. While this phenomenon
is not much different from what has occurred in a number of other
newly democratized countries, what does distinguish the situation in
Eastern Europe is the fact that the military and secret police have
lacked the power to resist such change even if they had been of the
mind to do so. Because of this, the generalized fear of retaliation that
continues to inhibit some other attempts at democratization, such as in
Nicaragua, has not proven to be a major problem in Eastern Europe.
This does not mean that decommunization will necessarily pro-
ceed smoothly, or that it will even begin to uncover the sins of prior
regimes or make restitution to their victims. For one thing, communist
rule was so complete, and continued for so long, that few, if any, as-
pects of the governing apparatus were not dominated by it, including
the judiciary. As a result, there is a basic problem of finding individu-
als qualified - professionally and, more importantly, politically - to
pass judgment on the actions and policies of communist rule.3
Related to this is the inability to escape the duplicity that marked
communist rule. As decommunization inexorably proceeds, and as the
crimes of the past are uncovered, the distinction between friend and
enemy becomes even more blurred than it had been previously. Almost
daily there are new revelations that many who previously were
thought to be the staunchest foes of communist rule, in some way,
found it necessary or politically expedient to collaborate with it in-
stead.4 Beyond this, scores of individuals have now come to the real-
ization that even those thought to be their closest associates were
really anything but this. What makes decommunization so bizarre and
so unsettling, however, is that it is by no means certain whether such
"revelations" really are what they purport to be. In short, it is politics
as usual - or is it? From a societal point of view, these daily occur-
rences have engendered a cynicism that will make decommunization
difficult if not impossible to achieve. The question truly becomes
whether anyone can be trusted?
Another legacy of communism is the notion that there is only one
"correct way" to go about changing the system, which has always been
orchestrated through the governing apparatus. Despite the ostensible
3. One country that seems to have been able to accommodate those needs has
been Poland, which essentially has been purging the judiciary for nearly a decade.
Stanislaw Frankowski, The Independence of the Judiciary in Poland: Reflections on
Andrzej Rzeplinski's Sadownictwo W Poisce Ludowej (The Judiciary in Peoples' Po-
land (1989)), 8 ARIZ. J. INTL & CoMP. L. 33 (1991); Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, Toward
an Independent Judiciary, REP. E. EUR., Sept. 14, 1990, at 28.
4. John Tagliabue, Eastern German is Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at
A5; John Tagliabue, Eastern German Quits Over Link to War Atrocity, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 1992, at A7.
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rejection of the communist system and its values, the new East Euro-
pean governments will have some difficulty accommodating themselves
to any kind of pluralistic political system. Added to this are the previ-
ously submerged rivalries between different ethnic factions in various
parts of Eastern Europe that threaten to engulf the entire region,
including, most notably, the ongoing genocide in the former Yugosla-
via.
All of the East European countries are poor; some, like Romania,
are desperately poor. This raises the question of whether a country can
pursue both democracy and justice at the same time. Several newly
democratized governments in this similar situation, such as the Latin
American countries, have taken the position that trade-offs have to be
made between the two, and often the pursuit of justice has been made
subservient to the goal of constructing a democratic society.5 Whether
these two ends really are in conflict is open to debate. More important-
ly, perhaps, is the perception that justice is backward-looking, whereas
democracy focuses on creating a better future.
The biggest hurdle of all to decommunization may be the inexora-
ble return of the former communists to power under the banner of
various socialist parties.6  The quintessential question is whether the
decommunization efforts that have taken place will stay, or possibly
continue, when those being investigated for past crimes continue to
hold some levels of power.
Although certainly unique in their own way, the present transfor-
mations in Eastern Europe are not unprecedented.7 Thus, it might be
useful to understand how other societies have undertaken to examine
their own pasts and with what results. Part II of this article uses sev-
eral examples to examine this issue: the treatment of Confederate
officials following the American Civil War; denazification after World
War II and comparable efforts in Japan; the overthrow of dictatorships
in Spain, Portugal, and Greece during the 1970s; democratization in
5. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Mark Gibney, The Imple-
mentation of Human Rights as an International Concern: The Case of Argentine
General Suarez-Mason and Lessons for the World Community, 24 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 165 (1992).
6. A.M. Rosenthal, So Back Come the Appartchiks in Eastern Europe, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 10, 1994 (commenting on the strong electoral showings of former
communists in nearly all of the eastern bloc countries as well as the former Soviet
republics).
7. See generally GUILLERMO A. O'DONNELL ET AL., TRANSITION FROM AUTHOR-
iTARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (1986); STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR
PARDON?, Papers and Report of the Conference of Nov. 4-6, 1988 (1989); U.N.
ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities, 32nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1985),
Study on amnesty laws and their role in the safeguard and promotion of human
rights, 38th sess. (preliminary report by Mr. Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur).
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Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile; and finally, similar problems
currently being faced in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa.
Part III provides an overview of the decommunization efforts that
have taken place in Eastern Europe to date, as well as those that are
likely to occur in the future. The problem in attempting to catalog
these events is that they change almost daily. Thus, more attention
will be given to overall trends rather than particular events. Finally,
Part IV takes a step back and asks what goals decommunization ought
to have as well as the proper means of achieving these objectives. The
new governments need to establish the truth about the nature of com-
munist rule. While it is important to prosecute those responsible for
past crimes, as well as to indemnify those who suffered the most under
the old order, it is even more vital for these governments to recognize
the social, moral, political and personal disintegration that was the
most devastating aspect of communist rule.' Perhaps the most impor-
tant objective that decommunization ought to work towards is first to
acknowledge and attempt to understand the past, and then to begin a
process of healing in these ravaged societies.
II. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES
A. An American Dilemma: Settling Accounts with the Confederacy
Nearly 130 years ago the United States government faced a situa-
tion with certain parallels to what Eastern European countries now
face: namely, how to deal with former officials of the overthrown Con-
federate regime. As we will see, many of the same conflicts that were
largely responsible for the war itself continued to play out through Re-
construction. In addition, the question of the appropriate policy to
follow with former Confederate officials brought about severely
strained relations between Congress and the Executive, eventually
culminating in the unsuccessful effort to impeach and remove Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson from office. Finally, and with decided parallels
with the nomenklatura in several Eastern European countries such as
Romania and Bulgaria, the Confederacy example shows just how in-
tractable the old guard can be, even after a devastating military de-
feat. A short time after the end of the Civil War, it was politics as
usual in the South as many former Confederate officials eventually
took their "rightful" place at the seat of power. Those who were victims
of the old regime, Southern blacks in particular, soon found themselves
in positions that were no better than those that had existed prior to
the war, and some which were arguably worse.
The first attempt to address the treatment of Confederate officials
after the civil conflict was over was made by President Abraham Lin-
8. For an excellent account of the relationship between political and personal
disintegration in Eastern Europe, see IvAN KLIMA, JUDGE ON TRIAL (1993).
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coln midway through the war. On December 8, 1863, Lincoln issued a
Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction that, subject to the ex-
ceptions listed below, set forth a plan to pardon former Confederate
officers who would take an oath to support "the Constitution of the
United States and the Union of the States thereunder."' Those who
were ineligible for the pardon were officers in the Confederate army
and navy above the rank of colonel and lieutenant, respectively; those
who had resigned commissions in the United States and aided in the
rebellion; civil and diplomatic officers of the Confederacy; those who
had left judicial and congressional posts in the U.S. government to join
the Southern states; and those who had engaged in the mistreatment
of prisoners of war. ° The Proclamation also stated that when persons
equal in number to 1/10 of those who had voted in the presidential
election of 1860 had taken this oath and established an appropriate
government, such state government would be recognized."'
Congress was of a much different mind. The Wade-Davis bill that
made its way through both houses of Congress would have required a
majority of enrolled white citizens to take an oath to support the Con-
stitution before a convention to reconstitute the state government
could be called. 2 Moreover, in order to be a delegate or to vote for a
delegate to such a convention, one had to take what was called the
"ironclad oath" contained in the Act of July 2, 1862.1" The oath af-
firmed that the person had never voluntarily taken up arms against
the United States, given aid to persons in rebellion, or exercised the
functions of any office under the Confederacy. Moreover, under the
Wade-Davis legislation, those who in the future held office, civil or
military, except merely ministerial offices and military offices below
the grade of colonel in the Confederate army, were declared not to be
citizens of the United States." In explaining the rationale behind this
legislation, Representative Davis, one of the sponsors of this legisla-
tion, claimed that the war "has placed citizens of rebel states beyond
the protection of the Constitution, and that Congress has supreme
power over them as conquered enemies. ""
The Wade-Davis bill never became law because of a pocket veto
exercised by the President. In response to the restlessness in Congress,
on May 29, 1865, Lincoln issued a second Proclamation of Amnesty
and Reconstruction, saying that while he was unwilling to give formal
approval to the Wade-Davis legislation, he regarded the system set
9. JONATHON T. DORRIS, PARDON AND AMNESTY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON
34 (1953).
10. Id. at 35.
11. Id. at 36-37.
12. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CiviL WAR 19-20 (1961).
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forth in the bill "as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any
State choosing to adopt it.""6
Following Lincoln's assassination, the conflict on this issue be-
tween the President and the Congress only heightened. While Con-
gress was out of session, President Johnson attempted to enact a plan
that was far more lenient than that proposed by his predecessor. Rath-
er than requiring action by a majority of voters as the Wade-Davis bill
would have required, or adopting Lincoln's "ten percent" plan, Johnson
sought to re-admit a number of Southern states simply when "that
portion of the people ... who are loyal" had written a constitution.17
In addition, under a very generous pardon plan, among those now
considered "loyal" to the Union were former top officials in the Old
Confederacy. The generosity of Johnson's plan, but also the resistance
to change in the South, was exemplified by the 1865 congressional
elections. Among those elected to the 39th Congress were the Vice-
President of the Confederacy, four Confederate generals, five Confeder-
ate colonels, six Confederate cabinet officers, and fifty-eight Confeder-
ate congressmen."
Congress subsequently refused to seat these Southern delega-
tions. 9 The fight between the President and Congress continued.
Over a presidential veto, Congress passed the Act of March 2, 1867
granting freed blacks the franchise for the first time.2 ° Under this leg-
islation, the only whites allowed to vote were those who had taken the
"ironclad oath."2' Consequently, of the 1,363,000 registered voters in
the former Confederate states, 660,000 were white, and 703,400 were
black.22 For a brief period, blacks held government positions in the
South, although the extent of what has been termed "Negro rule" has
been greatly exaggerated. During his tenure in office, President
Johnson established liberal guidelines for issuing individual pardons.
In addition, Johnson proclaimed a number of general amnesties for
Confederate officials, the final one occurring on Christmas day of 1868,
that had the effect of pardoning nearly every former Confederate, in-
cluding the unrepentant Robert E. Lee.' Soon enough, the "new"
South began to resemble the old Confederacy. Federal authority over
the southern states was in large part withdrawn, and one immediate
result was greatly increased violence against freed blacks by such
"underground" organizations as the newly created Ku Klux Klan.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 30-31.
18. FRANKLIN, supra note 12, at 43.
19. Id. at 56.
20. Id. at 70.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 80.
23. Id. at 83.
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As early as 1871, only a few short years after the end of the Civil
War, reconstruction was in shambles. Blacks were now effectively
disenfranchised through intimidation and violence, despite the promis-
es of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. In addition, the es-
tablishment of "black codes" actually increased the level of racial seg-
regation from what it had been previously and only worked to make
the plight of blacks that much worse.24 Finally, by the early 1870s,
former Confederates were firmly entrenched in power, politically as
well as economically. As historian John Hope Franklin has suggested,
the Civil War and the Reconstruction period actually brought about far
greater change to the North than it did to the South.'
In sum, within a short period of time after the Civil War, virtually
all efforts to prevent former Confederate officials from exercising politi-
cal power had failed. The ideal expressed in Lincoln's Second Inaugu-
ral Address, "with malice toward none, with charity for all," was never
realized. Instead, the continued influence of the rebels had been
achieved much more through intimidation, violence, and the exercise of
raw political power.
B. Post-World War II
1. Prosecuting Major German and Japanese War Criminals
The international proceedings against leading German and Japa-
nese officials after World War II also parallel the situation the Eastern
European Countries now face.2" Although the number of Axis leaders
convicted at Nuremberg and Tokyo was relatively small,27 these trials
were vital in at least two respects. The first was that these guilty
verdicts established under international law the principle that the
leaders of a nation could be held accountable to the world community
for their actions. John Appleman writes that
[tihis was the first time that those in command of a nation's desti-
nies have been called to general account. True, there have been
isolated instances where losing leaders have been exiled or slain,
but these were the price of defeat, not lawlessness. Henceforth, no
leader can initiate or wage war with impunity. It is no longer his
victory if he succeeds and the nation's loss if he loses. He may be
called to personal account in future tribunals.'
24. For a more extended treatment of this subject, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966).
25. FRANKLIN, supra note 12, at 226.
26. See generally ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATION-
AL LAW (1962); ARNOLD C. BRAcKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987).
27. There were 24 defendants at Nuremberg, 19 of whom were convicted, and 25
defendants at the Tokyo proceedings, all of whom were convicted.
28. JOHN A. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES vi.
(1954).
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A second principle established by the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) proceedings, one that was to play a central role in the subse-
quent trials of lower-ranking government and military officials, was
that the "superior orders" defense would not be upheld against the
charge of violating domestic or international law.'
Following the verdict at Nuremberg, a group of secondary leaders
was brought to trial for similar charges in what has been called the
"subsequent proceedings." 0 In addition, in both Europe and in the
Far East, the victorious Allied powers established military tribunals to
try persons charged with various war crimes. Although these military
trials were able to bring a substantial number of war criminals to
justice, vast numbers escaped prosecution. From his study of the Allied
military trials in the Far East, Philip Piccigallo concluded that over
ninety percent of those in the Japanese government and military who
could have been charged with war crimes ultimately escaped prosecu-
tion.31 Piccigallo attributes" this in large part to the inefficiency of the
prosecution and the lack of interest in such proceedings by the govern-
ing Allied powers. Moreover, attempts to prosecute war criminals soon
gave way to the political considerations of the Cold War.
Although the prosecution of Axis leaders for war crimes was an
important advance in international law, these trials are less relevant
to the present discussion than the larger, and more difficult, question
of how to treat the massive number of individuals who collaborated or
benefited from fascist rule. We turn first to denazification in the occu-
pied countries3 2 and then examine the problematic and puzzling ef-
forts in Germany and Japan.
2. Denazification in the Occupied Countries
In order to fully understand denazification in the countries that
had been occupied by the Nazis, it is first necessary to place these
events within the context in which they occurred. For the overwhelm-
ing majority of the citizens of the countries involved, occupation was a
terrifying experience. Government and social processes were totally
disrupted, property was confiscated or destroyed, thousands of inno-
cent people were killed in German reprisals, and large segments of the
29. For a further discussion of this issue, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF
'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1965).
30. There actually were 12 separate trials that went by different names: the
Medical case; the Milch case; the Justice case; the SS, Pohl case; the Flick case; the
Farben case; the Hostages case; the Rusha case; the Einsatzgruppen case; the Krupp
case; the Ministries case; and the High Command case.
31. PHILLIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES
OPERATIONS IN THE EAST 117 (1979).
32. Although the treatment of collaborationists was also an important issue in
the Pacific, particularly in the Philippines, much less is known about that phenome-
non. Thus, the focus will be on the actions of various European countries.
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native population were forced to support the Nazi war effort in one
form or another, partly perpetuated through mandatory conscription.
For various reasons, a sizable portion of the population in each of the
occupied countries collaborated with the enemy in some form or anoth-
er. Some attempted to benefit from the presence of the occupier, while
others apparently believed that collaboration was the only means of
surviving the war.
Liberation brought different responses. The most extreme form
occurred in France where members of the resistance took immediate
revenge against supporters of the Vichy government. Peter Novick
estimates that there were at least 4,500 summary executions in France
during the months after Liberation.33 Others have suggested much
higher numbers.' Such violence was rare in other European coun-
tries,35 although the desire to bring collaborators to justice was nearly
universal. One of the most extraordinary aspects of denazification was
its scope. Literally hundreds of thousands of people were imprisoned
for their actions during the war.36 For example, within two days after
being liberated from German rule, the makeshift Danish government
had arrested and interned over 22,000 suspected collaborators." Writ-
ing in 1948, Dutch law professor J.M. Van Bemmelen described the
substantial number of suspected collaborators who had been (or still
were) incarcerated for practices during the war.
In a small country such as Holland, about 100,000 people had been
put in prisons and prison camps after the liberation. A year and a
half later - in October 1946 - their number was still 50,000; in
January 1947 it was 33,000. Denmark had 10,871 political prison-
ers in April 1946 .... In France in January 1946 there were about
33. PETER NOVICK, THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF COLLABORA-
TORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE 71 (1968). This is not meant to suggest that vigilante
justice was the norm. During the course of denazification, more than 100,000 French
were brought to trial for their collaborationist activities. Id. at 153. In addition, of
the nearly one million civil servants, 11,343 received some form of sanction for their
wartime activities, and more than 5,000 were removed from office. Id. at 90. For
other accounts of denazification in France, see HERBERT R. LOTTMAN, THE PURGE
(1986); JULES Roy, THE TRIAL OF MARSHAL PETAIN (1967).
34. For example, Robert Aron has put this figure at 40,000. Roy C. Macridis,
France: From Vichy to the Fourth Republic, in FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY:
COPING WITH THE LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM 161, 171
(John Herz, ed. 1982) [hereinafter Herz].
35. There is an enormous amount of variation in the numbers purportedly killed
by resistance forces. For example, the office of the Italian Ministry of the Interior
has put the number at 1,732, while neo-Fascists have claimed more than 300,000
summarily executed. Giuseppe Di Palma, Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist?,
in Herz, supra note 34, at 107, 133.
36. Roy Macridis estimates that in France more than 400,000 individuals were
directly affected by denazification. Macridis, supra note 34, at 172.
37. Carl C. Givskov, The Danish 'Purge-Laws,' 39 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
447, 448 (1948).
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38,000 political prisoners .... In Belgium 44,000 people had been
deprived of their freedom after the liberation .... In Norway
25,000 out of 60,000 members of the Quisling-Movement (Nasjional
Samlung) had been arrested; in January 1946, 16,000 were still in-
terned. If political prisoners in Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and other countries are included, it
becomes evident that more than a million people are now in prisons
and prison camps for political offences.'
Several features of denazification should be of interest to present
efforts in Eastern Europe. One was the near-universal abandonment of
the principle nulla poena sine lege in order to be able to charge collabo-
rators after the war for actions that had not been criminal at the time
they were committed during the war. The rationale commonly em-
ployed was that the occupation itself precluded the passage of laws
against collaborating with the enemy. In addition, several countries re-
instituted the death penalty for collaborationist activities,3 9 although
relatively few individuals were executed.
Another noteworthy feature of denazification in the occupied coun-
tries was its quasi-criminal nature. For example, one of the more com-
mon charges of collaborationist activity in France was that of "national
indignity,"4 described in National Assembly debate as a "state en-
tered into" by one who "directly or indirectly, voluntarily aided Germa-
ny or her allies, or harmed the unity of the nation or the liberty and
equality of Frenchmen."41 Moreover, one's presence in this state was
to be "declared," not by a judicial body as such but by a "jury
d'honneur."42 In Denmark, a similar concept was expressed in the no-
tion of the "loss of common confidence."43 This entailed losing one's
political and civil rights and was originally done in a separate proceed-
ing following criminal prosecution. In Belgium, such individuals were
called "inciviques," and the "crime" they were accused of committing as
well as its consequences have been described in these terms:
38. Jacob Maarten van Bemmelen, The Treatment of Political Delinquents in
Some European Countries, 1 J. CRIM. SCI. 110 (1948).
39. In Norway, where the last death sentence had been carried out in 1876,
capital punishment was decreed by the Royal Ordinance of October 3, 1941. The
Dutch government-in-exile decided to re-introduce the death penalty on December 22,
1943, although this was not announced publicly until September 1944, when the first
Dutch territory was liberated. In Denmark, where there was no exile government,
capital punishment for treasonous acts going back to the beginning of the German
occupation was introduced by a law on June 1, 1945. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 210.
40. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 146.
42. Id.
43. Givskov, supra note 37, at 452.
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Both the government and the people feel that some punishment
should be given to those whose conduct during the occupation was
not what it should have been. For instance, all those who, without
being guilty, cannot be called innocent will, on a simple notification
of the public prosecutor, lose their vote, their right to engage in
certain professions, and so on. Those who feel they have been un-
justly penalized can appeal to the tribunals unless their cases have
already been examined by the commissions. Those who are thus
penalized will be able to request their rehabilitation and the recov-
ery of their rights in ten years' time."
As suggested above, collaborators were subjected to a number of
penalties. In addition to the more common form of criminal sanctions
- death, prison, fines and so forth - large numbers of individuals
also had their property confiscated and their civil and political rights
taken away.4' In addition, individuals could also be "purged" from
certain occupations, particularly those in government service, for their
wartime activities."" One of the most difficult situations involved the
judiciary. On the one hand, there was a desperate need for judicial
personnel to deal with the enormous number of collaborationist cases
and disputes engendered by the war, such as property confiscation. On
the other hand, in several countries, France and Holland in particular,
there was a deep-seated feeling that most judges had generally cooper-
ated with the Nazis. In France, for example, judges in the occupied
territories were required to take a special oath of loyalty to the "chef
d'etat."47 All but one judge in Vichy France had done so." Because of
this situation, only judges who had displayed an unusual enthusiasm
in carrying out the Nazi plans were purged from their position."
44. Pierre Vermeylen, The Punishment of Collaborators, 247 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SC. 73, 77 (Sept. 1946).
45. In Holland, those who had been members of certain German-sponsored mili-
tary and police organizations were judged to have entered the service of a foreign
power and were consequently deprived of their Dutch citizenship. NOVICK, supra note
33, at 212. In addition, the post-war Dutch government seemed most accepting of
vigilante justice aimed at the collaborators. HENRY L. MASON, THE PURGE OF THE
DUTCH QUISLINGS: EMERGENCY JUSTICE IN THE NETHERLANDS (1952).
46. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 79.
47. Id. at 84. In Holland, there was an attempt to purge judges who had either
1) shown themselves unfaithful to the Kingdom or the Crown, 2) had shown a
National Socialist state of mind by their conduct or utterances, or 3) had seriously
failed in the task during occupation, in a manner harmful to the Dutch judicature.
MASON, supra note 45, at 93. However, the purge was never completed and a settle-
ment was reached under the direction of Dr. Donner, who had resigned during the
occupation. Id. at 96-97.
48. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 84.
49. Id. at 87. On the other hand, the purge of the National Parliament was
much more complete. All those who had voted in favor of delegating all constituent
power to Marshall Petain on July 10, 1940 - 569 representatives total - were
purged from serving in this or any other political office.
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Despite the initial zeal for denazification in the formerly occupied
countries, most programs were terminated rather quickly. One reason
was the enormity of the task involved and the lack of adequate re-
sources and personnel with which to carry it out. In addition,
denazification did little to rebuild these devastated societies, and many
believed it detracted from such efforts. As a consequence, within a
relatively short period of time, nearly all of the sentences that had
been handed out were reduced, in some cases rather severely.' The
same was true for many of those who had been purged or had their po-
litical and civil rights restricted. Frederick Engelmann's description of
denazification in Austria, "uneven, formalistic, and quite brief,"5" was
essentially true in every other European country as well.
To see denazification in the occupied countries as a complete fail-
ure, however, would be a mistake. Virtually all of those who had col-
laborated with the enemy during the war were somehow called to task
for such actions. Moreover, thousands of individuals were fined, im-
prisoned, or had their property confiscated. Still others either had
their civil and political rights curtailed for a time, were removed from
their occupations, or else suffered some form of public acknowledgment
of their wartime activities. The larger significance of these efforts was
to somehow make public account of those "whose conduct during the
occupation was not what it should have been." In this respect,
denazification in the occupied countries had at least some measure of
success.
These efforts, however, failed to discern and understand some of
the larger truths about the occupation, and these facts, unfortunately,
still have not been confronted or addressed. Nowhere is this more
evident than in France. Although retribution against particular indi-
viduals was fairly common after the war,52 the French people have
never truly come to understand the nature of Vichy France. Instead,
the societal-wide conspiracy of silence that assisted in Nazi atrocities
during the war still exists today.' The recent prosecution and convic-
50. For example, Novick wrote that although nearly 40,000 persons were initially
imprisoned for collaborating with the Vichy government, this number had been
reduced to 13,000 by December 1948, 8,000 by October 1949, and under 4,000 by
early 1951. That year the first important Amnesty Law was passed. The result was
that the overwhelming majority of collaborationists only served a fraction of their
original sentence. NOVICK, supra note 33, at 187, 188. France is not the exception;
the same phenomenon occurred in the other occupied countries as well.
51. Frederick C. Engelmann, How Austria Has Coped with Two Dictatorial Leg-
acies, in Herz, supra note 34, at 135, 144.
52. See supra notes 33-36, 40-42, 49-50 and accompanying text.
53. Between 1942 and 1944, more than 76,000 French and foreign Jews were de-
ported to Germany. Most of these individuals were arrested by French police on
orders of French officials and were carried on French trains for delivery at the
German border. Alan Riding, The Painful Past Still Eludes France, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1993, at E4.
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tion of Paul Touvier may reverse this trend. As Ted Morgan reported
on the trial,
[t]he importance of the trial was that it presented the French past
as it really was, so that the nation had to face up to it, and to pass
it on to future generations. It became clearer than ever before how
the Milice [neo-Nazi police force] became a criminal enterprise and
how it conducted the roundups of Jews that were a part of the
Final Solution."
3. Denazification in Germany
Denazification in Germany occurred in two phases, each with
different aims and approaches. The first was under Allied control,
where an attempt was made to prosecute leading war criminals55 and
also to purge those in administrative positions who had most zealously
pushed the Nazi ideology. The second phase occurred under the direc-
tion and control of German authorities and attempted to pass judg-
ment on the wartime activities of the entire German population.'
Given the scope and ambiguous nature of this aspect of denazification,
its near total failure is by no means surprising. To begin to accomplish
this impossible task, questionnaires were sent to all Germans. 7 From
the answers provided, individuals were placed into one of five catego-
ries: major offender, offender, lesser offender, follower, and exonerat-
ed." After being categorized by a prosecutor, the defendant had to
deal with the local boards, or spruchkammem. If a defendant thought
that the categorization was incorrect, the burden was on the defendant
to prove it. 9 Yet, this ignores how relatively easy denazification was
for the overwhelming majority of Germans, including tens of thousands
of individuals who were in fact war criminals.
For instance, due to a lack of personnel, all individuals were auto-
matically categorized as "followers"' unless a person was actually
incriminated by himself or by someone else. This was rare, though,
due to the so-called "witnesses strike" and the recurrent claims of
"victor's justice." Even when denazification did seem to work, its effects
were short-lived."1 Amendments to the Liberation Law, as well as the
54. Ted Morgan, The Hidden Henchman, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 22, 1994, at 78.
55. See generally part II(B)(1) of this text.
56. For a discussion of these efforts, see Fritz Weinschenk, Nazis Before German
Courts: The West German War Crimes Trials, 10 INTL LAW. 515 (1976).
57. John Herz, Denaziftcation and Related Policies, in Herz, supra note 34, at
26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id.
61. The same phenomena occurred in post-war Italy. Di Palma writes that
[d]espite defascistization, the old administrative class remained in place.
Judicial applications of the purge decrees and a final amnesty adopted
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final amnesties in 1947 and 1948, allowed almost every case of major
offenders to be downgraded to the category of "follower.' 2 Moreover,
as Ingo Muller has recently shown, within a relatively short period of
time after the Germans took control over "denazification," former Nazis
actually fared better than those who had resisted the regime. Among
other things, under "Law 131" a perverse quota system was estab-
lished that actually gave preference for such things as jobs to former
Nazis and removed from office those who had resisted Nazi rule. Mul-
ler writes that
tihere was a general sense of relief at being rid of the unpopular
"de-Nazifiers." Only a minority of them found other work quickly;
two thirds remained dependent for a long time on welfare and
unemployment benefits. The exclusion of these outsiders, who could
have provided a counterweight in the government agencies of the
postwar period, accelerated the process of re-Nazification that was
to have a profound effect on the development of democracy in West
Germany. The few experienced public servants without an incrimi-
nating past, who were needed so urgently, were now considered to
have "incriminated" themselves by supporting de-Nazification; in
the early years of the Federal Republic, this was a far worse stigma
than to have been a National Socialist.'
How effective was German denazification? John Herz, perhaps the
most astute scholar of this phenomenon, has described the limited
goals and achievements of this policy as
at best barring certain persons temporarily from positions of influ-
ence rather than providing for their indefinite or long-term inel-
igibility to serve in such positions. In the economic field, the same
was true of the confiscations of property, which were restored fol-
lowing the downgrading or the exoneration of owners; confiscations
based on the verdicts of tribunals were extremely rare, notably, in
the case of industrialists or other major owners . . . .' The result
of both denazification and the prosecution (or nonprosecution) of
Nazi criminality may be summed up as follows: The top elite of the
Nazi regime, small in numbers, was eliminated (or eliminated itself
through suicide, flight abroad, and so on); most of the collaboration-
in February 1948 resulted in the fact that most of the 1,879 civil ser-
vants who had been dismissed . .. and the 671 who had been compul-
sorily retired were reinstated. Similarly, the whole process of confiscat-
ing the illicit gains of Fascist profiteers and of purging compromised
business leaders came close to naught. As to Fascist criminals, the justi-
fied restraint shown in the early legal proceedings turned, as the war
faded into the background, into a veritable travesty of prosecution ....
Guiseppe Di Palma, Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist? in Herz, supra note
34, at 122.
62. Id. at 28.
63. INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 203-4
(Deborah Lucas Schneider, trans., 1991).
64. Herz, in Herz, supra note 34, at 29.
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ist elite, in administration, justice, education, the economy, re-
mained in or reentered positions held under the Nazi regime.'
A good part of the blame for the failure of denazification rests
with the Allied forces. A short time after German authorities took con-
trol over the process, it should have been apparent that little would be
accomplished given its unsystematic nature. Although the various
military governments did urge greater efforts to bring Nazi officials to
trial," little else was done. Moreover, with the advent of the Cold
War, Allied officials, such as U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy,
actually pushed for the cessation of denazification. Notwithstanding
these shortcomings, however, a good part of the blame for the failure of
denazification rests with the Germans themselves. 7 In fact, some,
such as John Appleman, have suggested that Germany's half-hearted
attempt at denazification demonstrates that the rise of Nazism was no
accident:
It became apparent that Nazism was not a matter imposed upon a
people by the dictates of one man - but a militaristic spirit alive in
Germany at its roots and all too often affecting the men in charge
of such denazification tribunals or in positions of political power.'
4. Post-War Japan
Germany's minimal interest in removing Axis officials was mir-
rored by its wartime ally Japan. While the IMT proceedings and other
Allied Military Commission trials successfully brought some Japanese
officials and military personnel to justice, these trials touched only a
small percentage of Japanese war criminals."9 Notwithstanding this
fact, the Japanese government never undertook any investigation on
its own to uncover and punish other atrocities committed by its nation-
als during the war.7"
In addition to these military commission trials, the occupying
forces attempted to institute purges of those who had been "active
exponents of militarism and militant nationalism."7 The Allies en-
joyed very little success in this endeavor. Although screening commis-
65. Id. at 30.
66. See generally JAMES F. TRENT, MISSION ON THE RHINE: REEDUCATION AND
DENAZIFICATION IN AMERICAN-OCCUPIED GERMANY (1982).
67. It should be noted that while the Germans were far more successful in in-
demnifying those who had property destroyed, they were far less successful - or
interested - in compensating those who suffered through the horrors of the Holo-
caust. On this latter point, see BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH
FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST FOR COMPENSATION (1979).
68. APPLEMAN, supra note 28, at 358.
69. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
71. Arthur E. Tiedemnan, Japan Sheds Dictatorship, in Herz, supra note 34, at
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sions examined over two million questionnaires, only one-tenth of the
respondents (202,000) were actually purged.72 Moreover, the vast ma-
jority of these individuals were provisionally purged, meaning that
they were not removed from office. Consider the fact that only 830 out
of 42,251 officials who served in the Japanese bureaucracy during the
war were ever removed from office in the period following the war.73
In addition, the few who were purged invariably were replaced by their
former proteges.74
As in Germany, the attempt to rid the society of those responsible
for the war soon came to a halt. Not only were the Japanese them-
selves apparently not interested, but with the advent of the Cold War
neither were Allied officials. In February 1949, the Japanese govern-
ment began to "depurge" certain officials.75 By 1952, when Japan had
fully regained its sovereignty, only 8710 purgees out of the original
202,000 still remained in that status."6 The remaining individuals
were eventually pardoned.77
Aside from the treatment of individuals who committed crimes
against humanity, there is also the more important question of having
the Japanese people publicly acknowledge the war crimes they collec-
tively committed. In this sense, Japan and Germany offer stark con-
trasts. While there is little doubt that the vast majority of Nazi sympa-
thizers suffered very little recrimination or punishment," there is no
question that the German people have in some way addressed the
unspeakable crimes that their nation committed. One example of this
is the reparations payments made by the German government to vic-
tims of Nazi rule.79
The same cannot be said of the Japanese government or the Japa-
nese people." In fact, there has been scant acknowledgment of any of
the atrocities committed before or during World War II."' Only very




76. Id. at 202.
77. Id.
78. See generally part II(B)(3) of this text.
79. But see FERENCZ, supra note 67 (arguing that the government and private
corporations actively resisted indemnification).
80. For a fascinating discussion comparing and contrasting German and Japanese
reactions to the war, see IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR
IN GERMANY AND JAPAN (1994).
81. An interesting case involves the legal challenge by Saburo legaga, who
brought suit nearly 30 years ago challenging the actions of the Education Ministry
in censoring his accounts of Japanese wartime atrocities. In a decision handed down
earlier in 1993, the Japanese Supreme Court sided with the government in banning
Mr. lenaga's textbooks from use in schools. David Sanger, A Stickler for History,
Even if It's Not Very Pretty, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at A4.
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recently, for example, has the Japanese government even acknowl-
edged the fact that it forced thousands of foreign women to serve as
prostitutes for Japanese forces, 2 and after facing mounting interna-
tional pressure the Japanese government finally agreed to pay repara-
tions to the countries involved (but, inexplicably, not to the victims).'
In terms of the panoply of other war crimes - the fact that 20 million
people died in the Pacific war; the attempt to eradicate the Korean
language and culture; the rapes and killings in Janjing; and the star-
vation of over two million Vietnamese civilians8 - the Japanese gov-
ernment has been silent. One of the very few admissions of Japanese
wrongdoing was made by Prime Minister Morihior Hosokawa, who
personally admitted that the war was "wrong."' Now, the larger soci-
ety should make the same acknowledgment, and the Japanese govern-
ment should begin to pay homage and reparations to those who suf-
fered from Japanese wartime atrocities.
C. Transitions in the 1970s: Spain, Portugal and Greece
We now turn our attention to democratization efforts in other
settings, and in other times and places as well. The link between the
old and the new is Spain. Although an integral part of the Fascist
movement from the period before World War II, defascistization as
such did not come to Spain until Franco's death in 1975. It would be a
mistake, however, to view this year as a watershed. Instead, Spain
was well on its way toward democracy before this time. By the same
token, elements of the old regime continued to hold political power
after this time as well. In a sense, then, defascistization in Spain was
more of a gradual process, rather than the result of concerted govern-
mental policies." In short, unlike virtually every other country that
we will examine, there were no attempts at purges, no trials of former
government officials, and no land confiscation. Instead, there was a
quiet transformation from dictatorship to democracy.
In 1974, Portugal emerged from forty-six years of authoritarian
rule. Unlike the transition to democracy in Spain, the break with the
past in Portugal was both sudden and complete.87 Although the new
82. David Sanger, Japan Admits It Ran Army Brothels During War, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1993, at Al.
83. Andrew Pollack, Japan to Offer Reparations for Wartime Brothel Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1993, at Al.
84. Japan's Other War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, at E20. There also is
the question of whether those who suffered from Japanese brutality during the war
could bring a cause of action at this time. In January 1994, eight Dutch citizens -
some prisoners of war, civilian internees, as well as a woman forced into a Japanese
brothel - brought such a suit. Eight Dutch Citizens Sue Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1994, at A4.
85. James Sterngold, Admitting Guilt for the War: An Outraged Dissent, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at A2.
86. Edward Malefakis, Spain and Its Francoist Heritage, in Herz, supra note 34.
87. Kenneth Maxwell, The Emergence of Portugese Democracy, in Herz, supra
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regime went about purging some elements of both the left and the
right, it ultimately accomplished something far greater: a social revolu-
tion." In the south, landless workers seized the great estates and
established collective and cooperative farms." Most of the large in-
dustrial enterprises and banking and insurance businesses were na-
tionalized.' Portugal also abandoned its colonial claims in Africa.91
In short, the country emerged from the democratization process a
much different country than it had been previously.
The year 1974 also marked the return to democratic rule in
Greece after the seven-year dictatorship of George Papadopoulos (1967-
73) and Demetrios Ioannides (1973-74). Like the situation in Portugal,
the transition was engineered by a coup, in this case in the wake of
the regime's disastrous policy in Cyprus. This, however, is where the
two processes diverge. In a compromise between military officers and
political officials, the decision was made to turn power over to the
exiled former premier Constantine Karamanlis.9 2 Karamanlis moved
quickly against the old regime. He immediately released all political
prisoners and amnestied all political offenses (except those relating to
the rule of the colonels).9' In addition, all general secretaries of the
ministries and all prefects who held power under the junta were dis-
missed immediately." This was soon extended to all agencies, organi-
zations, and corporations operating under public law.95 All told, some
108,000 civil servants and other officials had been dismissed, trans-
ferred, or otherwise disciplined by mid-January 1975.
Karamanlis called for parliamentary elections for November, 1974,
less than four months after the removal of the dictatorship. Embold-
ened by a strong electoral showing, Karamanlis' regime then proceeded
to move against senior military officials, selectively retiring and trans-
ferring those who had been a part of the old order.97 The new govern-
ment also started to prosecute and purge four groups: 1) those involved
in the 1967 coup, 2) those responsible for the killings during the Poly-
technic University uprising of November 1973, 3) those responsible for
committing torture, and 4) those responsible for the coup in Cyprus.
Harry Psomiades writes of the prosecution of the former dictators that
note 34.




92. Harry J. Psomiades, Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy, in Herz,
supra note 34, at 251-274.
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[t]he trials, which received widespread radio, television, and press
coverage, served to demystify the dictatorship. The trials made
possible the exposure of seven years of maladministration, repres-
sion, scandal, corruption, and conspiracies and depicted a regime
much worse than even the military had imagined. The details of
torture, particularly of distinguished senior military officers by
subordinates, were most offensive to the professional officer class.
The statements and the demeanor of the accused revealed to many
their pettiness and their incompetence and destroyed within sec-
onds the military image of the strong man. The trials exposed the
"supermen" without their clothes, and what the public and the
officer corps saw, they did not like."
Still, the trial that aroused the most emotion in the country was the
first Military Police torture trial. Psomiades offers this analysis. "Trial
testimony offered a detailed picture of the junta's system of torture
and conclusive evidence that torture was practiced in a systematic way
in order to perpetuate the junta's control. It dramatized the system's
degrading effects on victims and torturers.P
Democratization in Spain, Portugal, and Greece occurred in mark-
edly different ways. In Spain, the process was quite gradual, and it
eventually became difficult to determine what was from the old order
or the new. In contrast, democratization in both Portugal and Greece
began quite suddenly, and both brought about far greater societal
change. Although Portugal experienced some purging, it is noteworthy
that it was aimed at elements of both the left and the right. In addi-
tion, far more attention was given to transforming the old order than
to examining its misdeeds. In contrast, the democratization that oc-
curred in Greece was not only more concerned with removing the ves-
tiges and the personnel of the dictatorship, it also sought to create a
national catharsis by publicly exposing the horrors of the colonels' rule.
D. Democratization in Latin America
Efforts by several Latin American countries - Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina, and Chile1" - to address the horrors of the past have oc-
curred with some form of logical progression. In Brazil, the govern-
ment made every attempt to seal off the crimes of the past, but it was
ultimately unsuccessful. Still, no prosecutions or purges occurred, even
98. Id. at 264.
99. Id.
100. Other countries in this region are also experiencing various forms of democ-
ratization, and they also have been faced with the situation of addressing crimes
from the past. One unique situation has occurred in Paraguay where Martin
Almada, a Paraguayan lawyer and teacher who was repeatedly tortured by soldiers
during the reign of General Stroessner, is attempting to lead an effort to bring the
perpetrators to justice. Isabel Vincent, Terror leaves a paper trail, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), June 19, 1993, at Al.
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when the perpetrators were known publicly. In Uruguay, the question
whether to pursue the past or not was the subject of public discussion
from the onset of democracy. In Argentina, the overthrow of the mili-
tary junta was premised on the idea of bringing those responsible for
the commission of gross human rights abuses to justice. Fairly soon,
however, practical and political considerations threw these efforts
aground. Finally, despite the continued presence of former dictator
Augusto Pinochet as head of military forces in Chile, democratization
has proceeded apace with some nascent efforts to expose the practices
of the dictatorial regime.
1. Brazil
Brazil initially came under military rule in 1964, although the
worst forms of political terror did not occur until 1969 when General
Emilio Medici assumed control over the Presidency.11 During the
next five years, thousands of Brazilians were either tortured or killed
in the course of the internal war against so-called "leftist subver-
sives."' ° In 1974, Medici was replaced by General Ernesto Geisel.
Although human rights abuses were not completely eliminated, a peri-
od of relative relaxation began. 3 The country entered a new phase
in March 1979 with the inauguration of Geisel's chosen successor,
General Joao Baptista Figueiredo. One of Figueiredo's first acts in
office was to issue a blanket amnesty for any state security agents who
might otherwise become liable in the future to charges arising from
their human rights violations. M As Lawrence Weschler comments,
"[i]ndeed, his edict was drafted in such a way as to foreclose even the
possibility of any future official investigations into the behavior of the
security forces between 1964 and 1979. Bygones were to be bygones:
the book was closed."1'°
Despite the amnesty, and in spite of the government's concerted
efforts to conceal this dark period of Brazilian history, the horrors of
the military's rule have now become public knowledge. Through a
daring and clandestine effort by several human rights organizations
and segments of the Catholic Church, the trial transcripts of those who
denounced their own torture in previously secret military trials was
published in a book that was to become a national best-seller, Brasil:
Nunca Mais.1 " Although this book documented who was responsible
for ordering and carrying out the torture and killings, because of the
amnesty proclaimed by Figueiredo, no prosecutions have taken place or
101. LAWERENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 47 (1990).
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id.
106. See WESCHLER, supra note 101. This book provides an exciting tale of the
brave effort to have the transcripts published.
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are likely."°7 Instead, although the truth has become known, individ-
uals go about their daily business as if none of this terror has oc-
curred, and torturers pass their victims on the street.
2. Uruguay
Until the 1960s, perhaps the South American country least likely
to experience political terror was Uruguay, described by some as the
"Sweden of South America." All of this began to change in the 1960s
when the government first sought to repress the Movement for Na-
tional Liberation, or the Tupamaros as it came to be called. By the
early 1970s, this internal conflict affected nearly all segments of the
population,"8 and its purpose was to terrorize the entire society.
Weschler writes:
Obviously, one of its main functions, as the architects of the system
declared outright, was to break the prisoners. But an even more
important goal appears to have been to break the wider society...
Uruguay was such a small country, and the repression there so
widespread, that everyone knew someone - knew several people,
in fact - in prison or under torture. The military wanted it that
way - relied on the fear that such knowledge engendered."°
The beginning of the end of military rule occurred in 1980 when
the regime's plebiscite for a new constitution was rejected by the popu-
lation. ° Through a political compromise, Presidential and legislative
107. This is not to say that participation in the terror has not had some ramifica-
tions. Weschler writes that
[iun some places . . . some men whose names appeared on the list were
summarily fired. In other places, during the months ahead, some men
found their careers blocked: the list was occasionally consulted as pro-
motions came under consideration. But for the most part those whose
names appeared on the listed [as having committed torture] retained
their positions and, thanks to the amnesty, had little more to endure
than the public's contempt.
Id. at 76.
108. The scope of the government's repression is numbing. Weschler provides this
description:
Of Uruguay's entire 1970 population of somewhat less than 3 million
(half of whom lived in the capital, Montevideo), somewhere between
300,000 and 400,000 went into exile during the next decade and a half.
Of those remaining, according to Amnesty International, one in every
fifty was detained at one time or another for interrogation; and one in
every five hundred received a long prison sentence for political offens-
es .... The sheer scope of this emigration, detention, and incarcera-
tion, however, only begins to suggest the extent of the military's abso-
lute mastery of Uruguayan daily life during this period.
Id. at 87-88.
109. Id. at 147.
110. Id. at 151.
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elections were held on November 25, 1984."' President Sanguinetti
took office on March 1, 1985. One week later he signed a bill that
constituted an amnesty for all remaining political prisoners, although
torturers and other military violators of human rights were explicitly
excluded."'
Soon thereafter, victims of the political terror began filing law-
suits against specific individuals in the military alleging torture, kid-
napping, disappearance, extortion, rape, and murder. As these cases
made their way through the judicial system, Sanguinetti proposed a
second amnesty, one that absolved military officials of any responsibili-
ty whatsoever. The Law Declaring an Expiration of the State's Puni-
tive Authority was passed on December 22, 1986,13 the day before
the first subpoena of a military official was due.
Late in February 1987, a group of human rights organizations
under the banner of the Commission National Pro-Referendum began a
campaign to overturn the impunidad law. In order to call a referen-
dum, it was necessary to have petition signatures of at least a quarter
of the number of people who had voted in the previous national elec-
tion."" Overcoming a tremendous amount of adversity, the pro-refer-
endum forces were successful in obtaining the requisite signatures.
Although the referendum was ultimately rejected (attributable in large
part to the thinly veiled threats by the ruling government)," 5 the
process itself seemed to accomplish something. Weschler balances the
positives and negatives this way:
Certainly, the two cases I've studied in these pages - Brazil's and
Uruguay's - afford no ideal outcome. (For that matter, no country
exists where anything remotely approaching the ideal has yet been
achieved.) The transition in both countries has been mired in the
muck of forced compromise, bad faith, self-delusion, betrayed hopes,
and abandoned responsibilities. In both of these instances, the little
success that was achieved was at the best provisional (there were
no trials in either country, no expressions of justice; torturers
whose prior conduct was thoroughly documented in Brasil: Nunca
Mais didn't even necessarily lose their jobs; in Uruguay, the refer-
endum finally lost and the issue was largely set aside)."'
Still, Weschler maintains, some victories were gained in both coun-
tries:
In both cases, thanks to the herculean efforts of relatively small
sectors of the population (in the case of Brazil, of an infinitesimally
111. Id. at 158.
112. WESCHLER, supra note 101, at 159.
113. Id. at 171.
114. Id. at 176.
115. Id. at 233.
116. Id. at 245.
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small sector), the interests of truth were served. Facts were estab-




During the early 1970s, Argentina suffered from a wave of vio-
lence carried out primarily by the leftist Montoneros movement."8 In
response, security forces and a terrorist group from the extreme right,
the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, undertook a counterattack
aimed at known or suspected left-wing terrorists, as well as those
considered to be sympathizers with the left. When the violence per-
sisted, President Isabel Peron declared a state of siege in November
1974." In 1975, the Peron government concluded that police and se-
curity forces were not capable of preventing terrorist activities. The
government then issued Decree No. 2770/75, which established the
Council of Domestic Security comprised of the President, the Cabinet,
and the commanding officers of the armed forces. 20 Decree No.
2772/75, issued the same day, gave the armed forces the task of carry-
ing out the "military and security operations they deem necessary to
annihilate subversive elements throughout the country.
" 121
Despite a dramatic downturn in incidents of left-wing violence at
the beginning of 1976, in March of that year the commanders of the
armed forces staged a successful coup. 12  Soon thereafter, the mili-
tary embarked on a guerra sucia, or dirty war, against so-called left
wing subversives and sympathizers. During the course of this "war," a
minimum of 8,961 persons disappeared, 123 and tens of thousands of
117. Id. at 245.
118. Alejandro M. Garro & Henry Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights
Violations in Argentina: One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward, 8 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 283, 287 (1987).
119. Id. at 288; Decree No. 1368, Nov. 6, 1974, in BOLETIN OFICIAL (OFFICIAL
GAZETTE), Nov. 7, 1974 (Arg.).
120. Id.; Decree 2770/75, Oct. 6, 1975, in BOLETIN OFICIAL (OFFICIAL GAZETTE),
Nov. 4, 1975 (Arg.).
121. Id. at 289; Decree 2772/75, Oct. 6, 1975, in BOLETIN OFICIAL (OFFICIAL
GAZETTE), Nov. 4, 1975 (Arg.).
122. There were actually three different military juntas. The first was comprised
of General Jorge Videla, commander of the Army (Aug. 27, 1975 - July 31, 1978);
Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, commander of the Navy (1973 - Sept. 15, 1978);
and Brigadier General Orlando Agost, commander of the Air Force (Jan. 1, 1976 -
Jan. 25, 1979). Members of the second and third juntas included General Roberto
Viola, commander of the Army (July 31, 1978 - Dec. 28, 1979); Admiral Armando
Lambruschini, commander of the Navy (Sept. 15, 1978 - Sept. 11, 1981); Brigadier
General Omar Domingo Rubens Graffigna, commander of the Air Force (Jan. 25,
1979 - June 19, 1982); Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, commander of the Navy (Sept.
11, 1981 - Oct. 1, 1982); Brigadier General Basilio Arturo Lami Dozo, commander of
the Air Force (Dec. 17, 1981 - Aug. 17, 1982).
123. Nunca Mas, Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disap-
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people were detained without being charged with specific crimes. Iain
Guest comments:
Never before had the resources of a state been geared to systematic
torture and murder. The Junta turned disappearances into a gov-
ernment policy and in so doing gave new meaning to the concept of
state terror. It was as deliberate, methodical, and calculated as
collecting tax .. 124
In 1979, the ruling junta declared victory in the war against sub-
version. In the face of growing domestic and international opposition,
the military government issued a law declaring that those who had
been reported missing during the previous five years were to be consid-
ered legally dead."u By 1981, the military junta was facing growing
demands from all quarters asking for information about the
"disappeared." Also at this time, the military government was met
with greater opposition from restless trade unions and political parties.
What ultimately caused the downfall of military rule, however, was the
disastrous Falklands-Malvinas war with Great Britain in 1982.
By 1983, a transitional junta was established to set the stage for a
return to civilian rule - not, however, before attempting to exonerate
the deeds of the military. On April 28, 1983, the government published
the Final Document on the War Against Subversion.12 This report
conceded that human rights abuses had occurred but that such actions
were in the "line of duty."'27 In September 1983, the military govern-
ment enacted the Law of National Pacification, which granted immuni-
ty from prosecution to suspected terrorists and members of the armed
forces for human rights violations committed between May 25, 1973
and June 17, 1982."2 Finally, the military junta issued Decree No.
2726/83, which ordered the destruction of all documents relating to the
"dirty war." On October 29, 1983, the state of siege was lifted, and free
elections took place. Civilian President Raul Alfonsin was inaugurated
two months later.
One of Alfonsin's first official acts was to issue Decree No.
158/831"29 ordering the arrest and prosecution of the nine military
officers who comprised the three military juntas from 1976 to 1983.
The Decree provided that under new legislation that was to be sub-
peared [also known as the Sabato Commission Report] (1986) at 447.
124. LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 32 (1990).
125. Law No. 22068, Sept. 12, 1979 on "Presumption of Death Because of Disap-
pearance" [1979-C] A.L.J.A. 2845; see Garro & Dahl, supra note 118, at 300.
126. Id. at 301; App. Court Judg. Sec. 46.
127. Id.
128. Id.; Law No. 22924, Sept. 22, 1983, [1983-B] A.L.J.A. 1681.
129. Id. at 302. Decree No. 158, promulgated on December 13, 1983, [1983-B]
A.L.J.A. 1943.
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mitted to Congress, such prosecutions were to be initiated before the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.13 ° However, the Decree also
provided that any judgment by the Supreme Council was subject to
review by the federal courts of appeal.'3 1 The jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Council was reasserted by the passage of Law No. 23049,132
the impending legislation referred to in Decree No. 158/83. One of the
most noteworthy aspects of Law 23049 was a provision that authorized
federal appellate courts to take away jurisdiction from the Supreme
Council if there was unjustifiable delay in the prosecution of these cas-
es. 1
3 3
As this was going on, the government also faced the problem of
the existence of the junta's self-amnesty law. In December 1983, the
Congress passed Law No. 23040 nullifying the amnesty provisions."
The Federal Court of Appeals subsequently upheld the constitutional-
ity of Law No. 23040, at the same time declaring the self-amnesty law
unconstitutional. 135
During that same month, charges were brought against the nine
military commanders who had served in each of the three military
juntas. By June 1984, the Supreme Council had made little progress in
determining the outcome of these cases." In October, the Council
issued a report announcing its inability to estimate when the criminal
proceedings would be completed. In addition, the Council also indicated
that, in its view, military operations against subversion were "unobjec-
tionable." 137 The report pointed out that the testimony of victims and
their relatives was so biased as not to be credible. 13 In response, the
Federal Appeals Court issued a resolution taking over the proceedings
against the military commanders. 139 In early 1985, the Court issued a
130. Id. at 303.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 306; Law No. 23049, Feb. 14, 1984, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 8 (1984).
133. Garro & Dahl, supra note 118.
134. Id. at 305. Law No. 23040, December 27, 1983, [1983-B] A.L.J.A. 1813. Arti-
cles 1 and 2 read as follows:
Art. 1. De facto Law No. 22924 is hereby repealed as unconstitutional
and null and void.
Art. 2. De facto Law No. 22924 has no legal effect with regard to crimi-
nal, civil, administrative, and military responsibility that said law in-
tends to affect. Article 2 of the Criminal Code in particular is inapplica-
ble to Law No. 22924.
What has been set forth in the foregoing paragraph is not altered by final judicial
decisions that have applied de facto Law No. 22924.
135. In re Fernandez Marino Amador, Oct. 4, 1984, [19851 L.L. 521 (Arg.). For an
explanation of the response of the Alfonsin regime, see Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to
Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100
YALE L.J. 2619 (1991).
136. Id. at 310.
137. Id. at 320.
138. Id.
139. Resolution [Acordadal No. 42, Oct. 4, 1984, published in L.L., Nov. 19, 1984
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series of indictments and placed several of the former leaders under
rigorous preventive detention.
The trial of the military commanders finally began on April 22,
1985, and lasted five months, during which time more than 800 wit-
nesses testified." Judgment and sentence were handed down on De-
cember 5, 1985. The Court found five of the former commanders guilty.
Two former Presidents - Generals Jorge Videla and Roberto Viola -
were both convicted. Videla, President during the first military junta,
was given a life sentence; Viola was given 17 years. Admiral Emilio
Massera of the Navy, a member of the first junta, was given a life
sentence and his successor, Admiral Armando Lambruschini, received
eight years imprisonment. Brigadier General Orlando Agosti, who was
head of the Air Force in the first junta, received a 4 1/2 year sen-
-tence."' These verdicts were upheld by the Supreme Court, which
slightly modified the sentences of Viola and Agosti."
Soon after the trial of the junta leaders, the prosecution began
pursuing charges against other military officers for their part in the
dirty war. However, in the face of growing unrest within the ranks of
the military, the Congress passed Law No. 23492, or the "Full Stop
Law."" Article 1 of the Law stated that the time had come for "the
armed forces to take part in rebuilding a democratic society."'44 Ac-
cordingly, 23492 imposed a 60-day deadline on the filing of any com-
plaints or charges against alleged torturers." Although the obvious
intent of the law was to impede, and perhaps preclude, further crimi-
nal proceedings, the prosecution was able to file over one hundred fifty
summonses before the February 22, 1986 deadline."
By March 1987, fifty-one military and police officers had been
arrested in connection with human rights cases, although only twelve
had been convicted and sentenced, including the five military generals
discussed above. 4 7 An important event that occurred at this time
was Major Ernesto Guillermo Barreiro's refusal to appear before the
Federal Appeals Court in Cordoba, seeking refuge with his army unit
instead. The commander of the unit subsequently announced that
Barreiro would not be turned over to the court and what followed was
an insurrection that came to be known as the Easter Rebellion."4
(Arg.).
140. For a description of the trials, see Speck, The Trial of the Argentine Junta:
Responsibilities and Realities, 18 UNIV. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.R. 491 (1987).
141. GUEST, supra note 124, at 389.
142. [1987-A] L.L. 531, 553 (1987) (Arg.).
143. Law No. 23492, Dec. 23, 1986, A.D.L.A. [XLVII-A] 193.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Garro & Dahl, supra note 118, at 336.
147. Id. at 337.
148. Id.
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In response, President Alfonsin made a dramatic trip to talk with
Colonel Aldo Rico, the leader of the insurrection. The rebellion col-
lapsed and many of its leaders were arrested. However, in the face of
this kind of military opposition, on June 4, 1987, the Congress passed
the law of "due obedience," Law No. 23521, which created an irrebutta-
ble presumption that military personnel accused of committing human
rights abuses were acting under orders and were unable to question
the legitimacy of these orders. 149 This irrebuttable presumption pro-
tected all military officers below the rank of Brigadier General. The
law even barred the judiciary from undertaking any case-by-case anal-
ysis to determine if the defendant's actions were self-motivated. As a
result, hundreds of officers were effectively immunized from prosecu-
tion. Guest writes of the due obedience law: "Alfonsin's long balancing
act aimed at healing the national trauma without humiliating the
military was finally over. It would be left to his Peronist successor,
Carlos Menem, to bring the curtain down on the final act.""s
It took a very short period of time for this to occur. In October
1989, almost immediately after assuming office, President Menem
issued a broad pardon covering nearly 280 people, some of whom had
taken part in various military rebellions against the Alfonsin govern-
ment, others who had been accused of committing criminal offenses in
carrying out the dirty war."'1 A year later the tragedy was completed:
Menem pardoned and released the military junta leaders who directed
the war including Jorge Videla, Roberto Viola, and Emilio
Massera. 52
Has Argentina's democratization been successful? On one level at
least, the answer to that question has to be no. Like many of the coun-
tries attempting denazification following World War II, the Alfonsin
government originally set forth an overly ambitious agenda that it did
not come near to accomplishing. Moreover, because of the widespread
and ambiguous nature of the prosecutions, there were numerous run-
ins with the military that, in turn, resulted in repeated retreats by the
government. In terms of what it set out to do, then, the Argentine
response was only moderately successful at best.
On another level, however, Argentina has achieved some notable
victories. Bringing former government and military leaders, at times
one and the same, to trial was a tremendous accomplishment for a
newly democratized country. Moreover, the trials themselves served
149. Law No. 23521, E.D.L.A. 260 [1987-A] (1987).
150. GUEST, supra note 124, at 390.
151. 2)0 Military Officers are Pardoned in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, at
A12.
152. Shirley Christian, Argentina Frees Ex-Junta Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, December
30, 1990, at A9.
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the same kind of catharsis function as the trials had in Greece.
153
Months of testimony not only brought forth the inhumanity of the
military regime but, just as importantly, the humanity of its victims as
well. In describing the trials of the military junta, lain Guest writes
that
[giradually, over these four months, the ghosts have started to slip
into this court. Some have come vividly alive again as witnesses
have recalled seeing them in the detention centers. Now they seem
to fill the benches as if silently waiting to pass their own verdict on
Argentina's "dirty war." What did they think of in those final terri-
fying moments, as they went to their deaths? The testimony has
been so detailed that it is impossible not to speculate.
15'
Finally, most of the truth about military rule has been published
in the Sabato Commission report, Nunca Mais. Like its counterpart in
Brazil, it soon became a national best-seller. In sum, Argentina's at-
tempt to come to terms with the horrors of its past has brought about
mixed results. It never effectively prosecuted the high number of offi-
cials that the government had intended to, and those who were prose-
cuted are now free. On the other hand, most of those responsible for
the terror have been removed from office, and the specter of military
rule appears to be a phenomenon of a long-distant past.
4. Chile
Unlike the situation in the other Southern Cone countries, Chile
is still in the process of attempting to deal with those responsible for
committing past horrors. As had been the case in Uruguay, Chile had
enjoyed more than a century and a half of stable, constitutional rule.
There were, however, social tensions between the left and the right
that were greatly exacerbated by the election of Socialist President
Salvador Allende. On September 11, 1973, Allende was killed in a
military coup and his party, Popular Unity, was removed from power.
A military junta took his place and quickly moved against leftist "sub-
versives." Constable and Venezuela write that
[bJy December, at least fifteen hundred civilians were dead - shot
in confrontations, tortured to death, hunted down by vigilantes, or
executed by firing squads. Thousands of detainees had been
shipped to military prison camps, more than seven thousand had
fled into exile after receiving safe-conduct passes, and the grounds
of the Venezuelan, Swedish, Argentine, Italian and British embas-
sies were jammed with asylum seekers. A revolutionary dream had
been crushed in a spasm of military fury, and a reign of profession-
al state terror had begun 5
153. Supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
154. GUEST, supra note 124, at 2.
155. PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE
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Pinochet consolidated his power by means of a plebiscite held in
1980, where two-thirds of the electorate ostensibly supported a new
Constitution drafted by the Pinochet regime. There have been many
reports of massive corruption in this plebiscite." Under the provi-
sions of the Constitution, Pinochet was to remain in office for eight
years. In 1988, another plebiscite was called - this time to enable
Pinochet to run for re-election - but a majority of the electorate voted
against this proposal. 57 In national elections that followed, Patricio
Aylwin Azocar was elected President."8 Although Pinochet surpris-
ingly gave up the Presidency, he has maintained a firm grip on power
in his capacity as the head of the military forces.
Aylwin took office in March 1990. Within a short period of time he
had created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which began to
gather evidence from relatives of people believed to have disappeared
during the years of military rule. In July 1990, mass graves were dis-
covered for the first time, touching a raw nerve in the military and
setting off a national debate regarding the repression of the Pinochet
regime." 9 In March 1991, President Aylwin addressed the nation on
national television and issued a report describing how 2,043 people
had been killed by military personnel, with most of the violence occur-
ring before 1978."w The report described how the secret police had
systematically killed those who were viewed as politically dangerous to
Pinochet's regime. On behalf of the nation, Aylwin apologized to the
families of the victims for the horrors described in the report, and he
announced plans to assist them with pensions and health and housing
care. 1 ' He also asked the Supreme Court to ensure that cases of hu-
man rights abuses were heard as soon as possible. 62
At this point it is not clear what action, if any, will be taken
against those responsible for the documented terror between 1973-
1988. The biggest obstacle is that Pinochet remains firmly in control of
the most powerful military establishment in the Southern Cone, and
he has repeatedly stated that there will be no prosecutions of any
military personnel." Another problem is that the amnesty law pro-
UNDER PINOCHET (1991).
156. Id. at 72-3.
157. Id. at 310.
158. Id. at 316.
159. Shirley Christian, Chilean Military Defends Killings, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10,
1990, at A2.




163. Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile Human Rights Report Answered by Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, at A6; Nathaniel C. Nash, Pinochet Assails Chilean Rights Re-
port, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at A3; Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile's Army Stands
Tall, and Casts a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at E4.
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claimed by the Pinochet regime in 1978 has been upheld by the Chil-
ean Supreme Court as recently as 1990.2" On the other hand, the
national legislature recently defeated a bill, the "Aylwin Law," that
would have disposed of all pending cases through secret civilian
hearings. These hearings involved more than 200 military officials
accused of killings, torture, rape, and beatings.1"
In fact, democratization has proceeded alongside efforts to uncover
the horrors of the past. In September 1991, under court order, the
Chilean government began exhuming and trying to identify the re-
mains of more than 120 people found in a mass grave.' In addition,
there have been some important developments in the case of Orlando
Letelier, Chile's ambassador to the United States under the Allende
regime, who was killed in a bomb explosion in Washington, D.C. Al-
though Chile had previously agreed to pay restitution to the families of
the deceased, for years it had refused to subject the masterminds of
the operation to criminal prosecution. In a remarkable change of
events, in July 1991, Chile's Supreme Court overturned attempts to
close the case. Then, on August 26, 1991, Justice Bandons issued an
order prohibiting the two defendants, General Juan Manuel Contreras
Sepulveda and Colonel Pedro Espinoza Bravo, from leaving the coun-
try. On September 21, 1991 Bandons issued an indictment against
Contreras and Espinoza, and, in a 3-2 decision, the Chilean Supreme
Court upheld this indictment. 67 In November, 1993, sentences were
handed down with Contreras being sentenced to seven years in prison
and Espinoza to six years."
Given Pinochet's continued and very visible presence in Chilean
political life, the effort to uncover the misdeeds of his rule has actually
proceeded further than might have been expected. Obviously Aylwin
had to walk a tightrope, but he performed a noteworthy job. Most
importantly, the Chilean government has made both a public acknowl-
edgment and an apology for the horrors of the past. In addition, the
new governments have made the decision to fully investigate the hor-
rors of the past, even if no punishment results because of the amnesty
granted under the Pinochet regime.
164. Supreme Court of Chile, Recurso de inaplicabilidad de ley brought by Alfredo
Insunza Bascunan, August 24, 1990, Manuel Contreras et al., Rol No. 553-78.
165. Nathaniel C. Nash, Chile Refuses To Forget Crimes of Past, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1993 at E3.
166. Nathaniel C. Nash, Graves Without Names Yield Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1991, at A4.
167. Indictment of Chile Police Chiefs in Murder of Ex-Envoy is Upheld, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1991, at A12.
168. Chile Sentences Two Generals for Letelier Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1993,
at A7.
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E. Other Transitions in the Present: The Painful Evolution to
Democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa
Peace is slowly and painfully being achieved in El Salvador and
Nicaragua after more than a decade of slaughter and mayhem in both
of these countries. As desirable as this is, there is some question
whether the tenuous peace that exists in both countries will bring any
greater understanding about the past. In El Salvador, a United Na-
tions Truth Commission has placed much of the blame for the horrors
of the past decade squarely on right wing politicians and army officers,
but rebel forces were not spared criticism either. 9 The Truth Com-
mission also suggested that, because of gross inadequacies in the
Salvadoran judiciary, no attempt at prosecuting those responsible for
these war crimes ought to take place. The national legislature readily
enacted a blanket amnesty a few days after the publication of the
Commission's report. 70
This is not to suggest that there has not been any progress in
attempting to rectify the policies of the past. For one thing, despite
constant delays from the original timetable established by the United
Nations, the Army has now been purged of certain officers responsible
for ordering some of the worst human rights abuses."' In a related
move, the architect of many of these policies, former Defense Minister
Rene Emilio Ponce, eventually was forced to resign from office. 72 Be-
yond this, certain truths about human rights abuses during the dark-
est days, most notably the massacre at El Mozote,173 have now been
confirmed. Still, few can be pleased that thousands of brutal murders
will not be prosecuted and that the few who have been convicted for
their crimes during the war will now be set free. In essence, exonera-
tion has occurred with very little acknowledgment and understanding
of the past.174
169. Tina Golden, Can the Truth Help Salvador Outlive Hate?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1993, at El.
170. Howard W. French, Amnesty in Salvador Denounced As Against Spirit of
Peace Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at A2.
171. El Salvador Finally Removes Military Chiefs, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1993, at
A5.
172. Howard W. French, Salvadoran Official, Under U.N. Scrutiny Over Rights,
Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1993, at A5.
173. Tina Golden, Salvador Skeletons Confirm Reports of Massacre in 1981, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at Al. See generally MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL
MOZOTE: A PARABLE OF THE COLD WAR (1994); Joan Didion, 'Something Horrible' in
El Salvador, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 14, 1994, at 8.
174. For a further examination of these issues, see John J. Moore, Jr., Problems
with Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty under the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El Sal.
vador, 43 STAN. L.R. 733 (1991). Exoneration has not been limited to El Salvador.
The so-called Christopher Commission, appointed after the public findings of the
U.N. Truth Commission were released, purportedly investigated U.S. policy in El
Salvador during these same years but found precious few "mistakes" - a result
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The situation in Nicaragua is not even this sanguine.' The so-
cial, political, and economic inequalities that brought about war in the
first place have not changed. In addition, there has been no real effort
to understand the causes of the civil war. Instead, Nicaragua teeters
on the brink of erupting into a bloody civil war once again. At this
point, prosecutions against those who committed war crimes would
serve no purpose and would probably exacerbate an already unstable
and dangerous situation. On the other hand, some attempt to learn the
truth about the war, its causes, the way it was conducted, and its con-
sequences is desperately needed because there is little prospect for any
real peace without it.
The transition from a white-dominated government in South Afri-
ca offers another case of attempting to deal with crimes of the past,
although these efforts are still evolving under the new regime of Presi-
dent Mandela. 7 ' The most controversial piece of legislation is the In-
demnity Act, which provides the State President with the authority to
grant amnesty to those who "advised, directed, commanded, ordered or
performed" any act with a political objective.1" The Act applies to ac-
tivities that occurred prior to October 8, 1990, although it also gives
the President the authority to extend this period."' The Act pro-
scribes both civil and criminal proceedings. 7 ' Those seeking amnesty
for acts that have not been punished must apply to the National Coun-
cil on Indemnity, which conducts its proceedings in secret."M
The biggest problem inherent in the Indemnity Act is its lack of
public accountability. Although lists of those who benefit from the
provisions of the Act are to be kept, there is to be no public record of
what the indemnification was based upon. While the Indemnity Act
might assuage segments of the right wing and the military, it does
nothing to advance national understanding concerning the insidious
which hardly squares with the findings of the U.N. Truth Commission Report.
Moreover, documents later released by the State Department have shown that
American military officers in El Salvador trained Salvadorans associated with right
wing death squads. Clifford Krauss, U.S., Aware of Killings, Worked With Salvador's
Rightists, Papers Suggest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1993, at A9; Tim Weiner, In 1990,
U.S. Was Still Training Salvador Civilians Tied to Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1993; at Al.
175. Tina Golden, Where Politics and Poverty Intersect, Signposts Are Missing,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at A5.
176. Most of the documentation of the human rights abuses that occurred under
the apartheid governments is the result of the Goldstone Commission. Bill Keller,
Inquest Finds South Africa Police Aided Zulus in Terror Campaign, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar, 19, 1994, at Al.
177. Act No. 163-92, Further Indemnity Act (Nov. 9, 1992).
178. Lynn Berat, Prosecuting Human Rights Violators From a Predecessor Regime:
Guidelines for a Transformed South Africa, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 199, 211
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nature of apartheid rule. The African National Congress has strongly
opposed the Act, and the amnesty itself might serve to heighten ten-
sions rather than helping to usher in a new political and social spirit.
Improbably set alongside these acts of amnesty, President
Mandela has vowed to probe into political crimes committed under the
apartheid regime. Toward that end, on his 100th day in office,
Mandela established a truth commission. 181
F. Transitions to Democracy: An Appraisal
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the transitions that we have
examined thus far is how incomplete and ineffectual they have been.
In the U.S. Confederacy example, those who had been in power in the
South prior to the Civil War quickly regained power despite efforts by
Congress to remove them. The examples following World War II seem
to teach the same lessons. Despite the military defeat and devastation
of both Germany and Japan, many of those who had previously wield-
ed power in each country continued to do so within a fairly short time
after Allied governance was removed. In fact, however, many of the
aborted purges were accomplished with the blessing of the Allied pow-
ers, as Cold War political considerations soon took precedence over the
aim of removing or punishing members of the old order. One important
lesson that does emerge rather clearly is that it is impossible and
counter-productive to attempt to hold an entire nation accountable, as
was attempted in Germany.
The more recent examples of democratization offer a mixed bag.
The transitions in countries such as Brazil and Spain took place over
such an extended period of time that it became nearly impossible to
separate the old regime from the new. One difference between these
two situations is that more of the truth is known about the situation in
Brazil than that of Franco-led Spain. In neither case were any prosecu-
tions brought or purges carried out. The transitions in Portugal,
Greece, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile were much more sudden in
terms of particular events - coups, referenda, elections, and the like.
Still, in each country it has been very difficult to remove the influence
and power of the old order. What has been achieved in several cases,
most notably, Greece, Argentina, and Chile, is some greater under-
standing of the past, and in the case of Greece and Argentina, some
measure of justice against some of the perpetrators of the worst hu-
man rights abuses.
El Salvador, Nicaragua, and South Africa were also briefly exam-
ined, although one still cannot be certain, at the present time at least,
that these countries are truly in the process of transforming them-
selves to peaceful democracies. The best candidate for such a transition
181. Mandela to Probe Apartheid Crimes, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 19, 1994, at 2.
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appears to be El Salvador, which has not only been able to maintain
the peace after more than a decade of civil war, but through the U.N.
Truth Commission there has been an important attempt to understand
the genesis of the conflict and the manner in which it was carried out.
What is most unfortunate, however, is that no prosecutions or purges
will ensue because of an amnesty law that was passed within days of
the publication of the U.N. report.
We now turn to Eastern Europe and the decommunization efforts
that have occurred to date. In many respects, these countries are bet-
ter situated to address the crimes of the past for two reasons. One is
that there is little apparent opposition to such efforts by the military
in any of these countries. The second reason is that, unlike many of
the other countries that we have examined, the vast majority of the
population desperately wanted to see the removal of the communist
regime. Working against these efforts, however, have been two phe-
nomena. One, simply, is the poverty that afflicts so much of the East-
ern bloc and, coupled with that, the desire to move forward rather
than to examine the past. The second major obstacle involves yet an-
other aspect of communist rule, most notably the distrust and disinfor-
mation that continue to infest these societies.
III. DECOMMUNIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE
Once the euphoria of the fall of communism quickly passed, the
people of Eastern Europe were faced with the cold prospects of dealing
with the aftermath of decades of communist rule. Most of the new non-
communist governments seem uncertain what end they hope to accom-
plish. One of the biggest obstacles, mentioned earlier, is that the du-
plicity that marked the old order has not been removed. If anything,
the transformation has possibly added a new layer of distrust and
misinformation. What follows are some of the more noteworthy trends
of decommunization efforts to date.
A. Germany
For a variety of reasons, the most important of which has been
reunification itself, decommunization has seemingly proceeded further
in Germany than in any of the other former Eastern bloc countries.
Already, thousands of individuals in certain occupations, such as pub-
lic officials, judges, police officers, professors, and schoolteachers, have
been purged from their occupations." 2 An agreement between East
and West Germany has established a legal framework for reprivatiza-
tion to occur.1" Several former East German border guards have
182. John Tagliabue, East Europe Astir on Ex-Communist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1992, at A3.
183. Katie Hafner, The House We Lived In, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 10, 1991, at
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been tried and convicted of killing individuals who sought to es-
cape.' The secret police apparatus (Stasi) has effectively been dis-
mantled, and individual citizens have been given ownership rights over
their own files.'85 In addition, the former head of the secret police,
Erich Mielke, has been prosecuted and convicted of murder. Finally, a
Legislative Commission under the leadership of former dissident
Rainer Eppelmann is conducting a sweeping investigation into the
effects of communist rule.'
Despite this apparent progress, however, decommunization has
raised as many issues as it has answered. For one thing, there has
been a continuous charge made that decommunization has only focused
on lesser or peripheral officials of the old order, such as the young bor-
der guards, while many former leaders of the communist regime have
been immune from criminal prosecution. The most visible example of
this allegation involves Erich Honecker, the long-time leader of East
Germany who was eventually returned to Germany after an extended
stay in Russia only to be allowed to move to Chile and pardoned from
trial because of the purported nature of his health. Criticism grew
when rank and file soldiers were prosecuted before those who had
given orders, and the few convictions of former top officials that have
occurred have provided scarcely little understanding of the nature of
communist rule. l"7
A continuing problem facing decommunization in Germany, and
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, relates to the volume of information and
records that have to be sifted through, as well as the number of indi-
viduals who apparently collaborated with the secret police. For
starters, it is estimated that there are more than 1.5 billion pages of
Stasi reports, the vast majority of which are mundane material of
inconsequential events."s The number of individuals who spied on
others - some tens of thousands of individuals who worked directly
with the Stasi, and upwards of 180,000 who were "unofficial collabora-
tors" - is rather astonishing, and this fact' alone will make any at-
32.
184. Stephen Kinzer, 2 East German Guards Convicted of Killing Man as He Fled
to West, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992, at Al; David Margolick, 'Just Following Orders':
Nuremberg, Now Berlin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at E6; 2 More Guards Convicted
in Wall Killings, J. & COURIER (Lafayette, IN), Feb. 6, 1992, at A5.
185. Stephen Kinzer, East Germans Face Their Accusers, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Apr.
12, 1992, at 24.
186. Stephen Kinzer, German Panel To Scrutinize East's Rule and Repression,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1992, at A4.
187. Stephen Kinzer, 3 Ex-East German Leaders Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1993, at A3. Those recently convicted were former Defense Minister Heinz Kessler,
his deputy Fritz Streletz, and Hans Albrecht. All were convicted of inciting border
guards to kill citizens who sought to flee westward.
188. Kjell Engelbrekt, The Stasi Revisited, RFE/RL RES. REP., Nov. 19, 1993, at
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tempt to purge or punish that much more difficult.89 Since January
1992, anyone mentioned in Stasi documents had the right to examine
any document pertaining to that individual, except for the portion
containing the name of the informant."9 However, as of mid-1993,
only 625,000 individuals had been given this opportunity.' As a re-
sult of this slow process, a proposed amnesty for East German secret
police officials who had committed "misdemeanors" that was scheduled
to go into effect on the third anniversary of German reunification,
October 3, 1993, was postponed until the end of 1995."
On the surface, decommunization in Germany has proceeded rath-
er smoothly, especially in comparison to some of the other Eastern bloc
countries, but there have been some major problems. The most note-
worthy problem has been the apparent indecision of the government
regarding prosecution of members of the old order. One such example
involves the rather bizarre proceedings against Erich Mielke, the for-
mer chief of the secret police in East Germany. Mielke headed the
Ministry of State Security from 1957 until the Berlin Wall collapsed in
1989. Still, the charges that he faced were based on events relating to
the killing of two police officers in 1931.' It is puzzling how or why
the prosecution of this particular individual would advance
decommunization. If anything, the decision to initially prosecute
Mielke for his activities that occurred over 60 years ago, rather than
for his actions as the head of Stasi, gives every indication that the gov-
ernment is hesitant to delve into the reign of terror of the communist
regime.9 4
As in each of the other Eastern bloc countries, the German repri-
vatization program has run into a number of unforeseen administra-
tive problems that have slowed such efforts considerably. Under the
German program, former owners will be able to reclaim property they
had once owned before confiscation occurred, or be compensated if this
is not possible. 9' Notwithstanding this, there are several unique
189. Id. at 21.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 19.
192. Id.
193. Stephen Kinzer, German on Trial in 1931 Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1992, at A3; Stephen Kinzer, German Ex-Police Chief is Guilty in 1931 Murders,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1993, at A6.
194. Another indication of the ambivalence of decommunization is the recent
conviction of Hans Modrow who was a former state premier in East Germany.
Modrow was convicted for the obvious: vote tampering by the communist party. Marc
Fisher, E. German Ex-Premier Convicted, WASH. POST, May 28, 1993, at A32. What
the trial lacked was any meaningful examination into communist rule. Moreover,
Modrow's case is only the first of 50,000 possible prosecutions that might be
brought. Id.
195. For an excellent overview of the land agreement and its inherent problems,
see Dorothy Ames Jeffress, Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property Upon
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features to this plan. The first is that the baseline for reprivatization
is 1933, so as to include land that had been confiscated by the Nazis.
However, property that had been confiscated between 1945 and 1949,
the period of Soviet occupation, has been exempted as part of the deal
originally struck with the Soviets to allow reunification to occur. In
addition, the Bundestag subsequently made a number of changes to
the law, attempting to favor the interests of investors over those of
former owners, to the point where the law is now referred to by some
as the "Law on the Abolition of Restitution."1" As a final point, per-
haps the sheer scope of reprivatization remains the biggest obstacle of
all as more than one million claims for the return of property have
already been made.197
Decommunization in Germany has raised a number of thorny
issues. One is whether East German officials should be held to a high-
er, or different, standard than their (former) West German counter-
parts. This question has been raised repeatedly in the case involving
Markus Wolf, a former East German spy, who claims that his "crimes"
were nothing more than what was also done by West German and
American officials." 8 A related issue is whether it is hypocritical to
purge those who cooperated with the East German regime when that
was the stated policy of the West German government's Ostpolitik.',
Finally, things have come full-circle when some (former) East German
politicians have asked how it is that Western politicians who were so
resistant to denazification are suddenly pushing decommunization.
B. The Former Czechoslovakia
Clearly the most controversial aspect of decommunization in the
former Czechoslovakia was the "lustration" law passed by what was
then the Czech and Slovak National Assembly on October 4, 1991.2"
Under its terms, individuals associated with the communist regime
were placed into three broad categories. The first consisted of those
who were former secret police agents and their collaborators or former
members of the communist party who held positions of authority from
the district level up. These individuals are banned from certain high
German Unification, 101 YALE L.J. 527 (1991).
196. Ulrich K Preuss, Restitution vs. Investment, 1 E. EUR. CoNST. REV. 22, 24
(Summer 1992).
197. Tyler Marshall, Germany's Judicial Nightmare, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991, at
Al.
198. John Tagliabue, Ex-Spymaster Has Germans Curious, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1991, at A4; Craig R. Whitney, A Top Spy's Trial Opens in Germany, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1993, at All.
199. See generally TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, IN EUROPE's NAME: GERMANY AND THE
DIVIDED CoNTINENT (1993).
200. Jiri Pehe, Parliament Passes Controversial Law on Vetting Officials, 2 REP.
E. EUR. (No. 43), Oct. 25, 1991, at 4.
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level administrative positions for a period of five years.2 ' They are
deemed guilty if their names appeared in the files of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.2 2 The second category are those who have been
termed "conscious collaborators." A third class of individuals were
those who fell into what has been termed Category C, "potential candi-
dates for collaboration." In February 1992, an Independent Appeals
Commission was created, and one of its major purposes was to hear
appeals by those who claim to have been wrongly accused of conscious
collaboration. However, it soon became apparent that the overwhelm-
ing majority of cases before the Commission consisted of so-called Cat-
egory C cases. Moreover, in many of these cases, individuals had been
"talked to" by the authorities but had refused to cooperate, yet they
were still listed as "potential candidates for collaboration." In response,
the chairperson of the Commission then brought a suit before the new-
ly created Constitutional Court challenging the legality of the
lustration law in its entirety. In November 1992, the Court ruled that
Category C was illegal but that the remaining paragraphs of the law
were within the bounds of the Constitution.2 3
Although the legality of lustration apparently has been settled,
the law has a number of critics. For example, human rights scholar
Jiri Pehe has argued that
[t]he chief flaw of the... legislation is that it is partially based on
a presumption of guilt rather than of innocence; that is, the burden
is on people in certain government positions to prove they did not
work for the secret police or were not communist officials. More-
over, by barring entire categories of people, such as former com-
munist officials, from holding certain positions, the law espouses
the principle of collective guilt. Impractical as it might have been,
the government's original draft sought to avoid enshrining that
principle by stipulating the necessity of proving a particular
official's participating in the suppression of human rights under the
communist regime. Finally, the law does not distinguish between
various degrees of guilt. Former secret police officials will be treat-
ed no more severely than people who were coerced into collaborat-
ing with or informing for the secret police.'
One of the biggest problems lustration has faced in practice is the
inability to verify the information in the secret police files. Instead,
names of "informants" and "collaborators" of the old regime have ap-
peared and disappeared, depending on who has been able to obtain
201. Ross Larsen, Thousands on Leaked StB List, But Is it Legitimate?, PRAGUE
POST, June 9-15, 1992, at 1.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 19.
204. Pehe, supra note 200, at 8.
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and circulate such lists.2 5 In a recent review of the lustration law,
Paulina Bren concludes that
[diespite the initial high hopes, lustration does not seem to have
fulfilled all of its stated aims. On the one hand, it has prevented
some former communist officials and StB collaborators from acquir-
ing positions of current political and economic influence. On the
other hand, it has also fostered an atmosphere of political instabili-
ty in which scandals often took precedence over more important
legislation. Nor, it seems, has lustration necessarily allayed the
public's suspicions that former communist officials and StB collabo-
rators continue to exert political and economic influence and to
reap the same benefits as were afforded them under the communist
regime.'
More recently, the Czech Parliament adopted the "Law on the
Illegitimacy of and Resistance to the Communist Regime," which,
among other things, lifts the statute of limitations for ideologically
motivated crimes committed between February 25, 1948, and Decem-
ber 1989.2"7 Proponents of the law have argued that the number of
prosecutions will be quite limited.0 s The more important question is
whether such trials will serve to illuminate the true essence of commu-
nist rule.
The new government already has prosecuted several high level
officials of the communist regime.2' However, it is not clear what the
government hopes to accomplish through these trials. There already is
the puzzling situation involving Miroslav Stepan, a former member of
the Central Committee Presidium, who was originally sentenced to a
four-year prison term on charges of abuse of power for ordering that
force be used against anticommunist demonstrators in 1988 and 1989.
205. Paulina Bren, Lustration in the Czech and Slovak Republics, RFE/RL RES.
REP. 16, July 16, 1993, at 16.
206. Id.
207. Jan Obrman, Czech Parliament Declares Former Communist Regime Illegal,
RFE/RL RES. REP., Aug. 13, 1993, at 6. The law reads as follows:
The CPCS, its leadership, and its members are responsible for the man-
ner in which our country was administered in the years 1948 to 1989;
[they are responsible) for the systematic destruction of the traditional
values of European civilization; for the intentional violation of human
rights and freedoms; for the moral and economic decay that was accom-
panied by judicial crimes and terror against those who held views differ-
ing [from those of the state]; for the replacement of a functioning mar-
ket economy by a command economy [and] by the de*struction of tradi-
tional principles of ownership; for the abuse of education, science, and




209. Taking Communists to Court: Road Strewn With Nettles, Czechs Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1992, at All.
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Stepan appealed and his sentence was reduced to two years. He was
released in October 1991, having served less than half of his sen-
tence.21°
President Havel has been ambivalent about decommunization.
While decrying a "witch hunt," he has agreed that some measures
against communist officials need to be taken,2" particularly when so
many are currently among the economic elite of the country. Havel
opposed the lustration law primarily because of its presumption of
guilt and the fact that it will only affect the "small fry." Havel has also
expressed reservations about the vetting of officials, but he ultimately
supported proposals by the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slo-
vak National Councils that required the vetting of officials in the
country's legislative and executive bodies.212 Finally, while supporting
the prosecution of former communist officials in theory, Havel has
opposed such proceedings for charges that allege only that the individ-
ual was a part of the old regime. One of the major concerns of the new
government is to create an independent judiciary. Toward that end,
the National Parliament has established a Constitutional Court to
concern itself with determining the constitutionality of laws passed by
the government of the new Czech Republic.
Finally, there has been a concerted effort to make restitution to
the victims of communist rule. One measure has been the passage of
the Law on Legal Rehabilitations that nullifies verdicts handed down
by the communist courts.213 In addition, the former Czechoslovakian
government passed a series of reprivatization laws that seek to provide
for the return of property confiscated by communist officials to the
previous owners. Although the Czech Republic has been successful in
returning a substantial number of businesses and properties that had
been confiscated by the communists back to their previous owners, it
now appears as if further restitution efforts will be halted.214
It is quite unfortunate that the lustration law has come to domi-
nate decommunization in the Czech Republic."5 The same kinds of
210. Id.
211. Interview with Martin Butora, Assistant to the President for Human Rights,
at Prague Castle, Czechoslovakia (Prague, June 12, 1992).
212. Jan Obrman, Laying the Ghosts of the Past, REP. E. EUR., June 14, 1991, at
4.
213. Actually, the law is slightly more complicated than that. One category in-
volves "political crimes" for which the convicted are automatically exonerated. Crimes
in this category include charges of high treason, espionage, sabotage, illegal emigra-
tion, illegal gathering, etc. The second class of crimes affects those who were sen-
tenced under laws that have since been abolished, but who were charged with using
violence or promoting fascism. Individuals convicted of this category of crimes must
apply for a review of their cases within two years after passage of the act. Jan
Obrman, Rehabilitating Political Victims, REP. E. EUR., Dec. 14, 1990, at 5.
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REP., July 15, 1994.
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ends could be achieved by more subtle and fair means. As it stands
now, decommunization is unlikely to meet many of its objectives be-
cause of the sharp resistance to the lustration law, both by those asso-
ciated with the old order and those who were the harshest critics of
communist rule. Prosecutions of former top communist officials should
continue, but such trials need to focus on exposing the truth about the
nature of communist rule. These are not, nor should they be, treated
as the routine criminal proceedings brought to date.
C. The Other Eastern Bloc Countries
The other Eastern bloc countries have attempted various forms of
decommunization, and some have had more success in this regard than
others. In Romania,"' decommunization began with the summary
trial and execution of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife.217 Immediately
following, four of Ceausescu's henchmen" 8 were convicted on charges
of genocide and sentenced to life imprisonment."9 For the first time
in the nation's history, a public trial was broadcast live in its entirety.
In addition, several relatives of the Ceausescus have also been prose-
cuted. One of Ceausescu's brothers was found guilty of murder,22
and the dictator's son was found guilty of shooting at demonstrators
without warning, leading to a twenty year prison sentence."
Despite these efforts, there is a very real question of whether-
decommunization in Romania really is a change from the old order.
Most notably, there is every indication that the brutal secret police
apparatus - formerly named the Securitate - has changed in form
but not in its method of operation. 2 Finally, decommunization will
further in the Czech Republic than in the Slovak Republic. Thus, the comments here
are restricted to the former.
216. See generally Truth and Justice: The Question of Accountability for Stalinist
Crimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 9 N.Y. L. SCH. J HUM. RTS. 599
(1992)(remarks of Adrian Nitoiu, General Justice, Military Section of the Supreme
Court of Justice).
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220. Alec Russell, Dictator's Brother Jailed for 15 Years, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June
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only take on some real meaning to the population when the country's
abject poverty is alleviated.
In Bulgaria, the continuing influence of communist rule continues
to plague decommunization efforts. Revelations of the existence of
concentration camps and the atrocities committed there during the
past few decades have now been made public, but there has been very
little action in prosecuting those responsible. The halting effort to pros-
ecute former party and state leader Todor Zhivkov finally has been
completed and the unrepentant Zhivkov has been sentenced to seven
years in prison.' One of the more puzzling aspects of this particular
case is why, given the atrocities committed under Zhivkov's rule,
charges of embezzlement were brought in lieu of crimes committed
during the forced assimilation campaign of ethnic Turks or other ex-
amples of gross human rights abuses.
Criminal proceedings have also been brought against Petar
Mladenov, the former longtime minister of foreign affairs who replaced
Zhivkov after a coup in 1989; four former prime ministers, Stoyan
Todorov, Grisha Filipov, Georgi Atanasov, and Andrey Lukanov; and a
host of lesser communist officials. It is questionable whether any con-
victions will ensue. One major obstacle is the continuing influence of
former communists and members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party
(BSP), the successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party.' Another is
that the prosecutions will be barred by the statute of limitations.'
Finally, the people in this impoverished country exhibit little interest
in continued rounds of seemingly endless litigation, particularly when
members of the old order still seem to be firmly in control.' 5
Poland presents an interesting study because, until the elections
in the fall of 1993, decommunization seemed to be gradually occurring
without any kind of lustration law227 or trials of any note.2" In-
stead, certain occupations, such as the judiciary, have slowly been
purged during the course of the past decade.' Now that former com-
munists have made substantial gains in the governing apparatus, it is
223. Kjell Engelbrekt and Duncan M. Perry, The Conviction of Bulgaria's Former
Leader, RFEIRL RES. REP., Oct. 23, 1992, at 6.
224. Kjell Engelbrekt, Bulgaria's Communist Legacy: Settling Old Scores, RFE/RL
RES. REP., July 10, 1992, at 6.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. In the summer of 1992, the Polish Parliament passed a resolution that
would have made public the names of communist informers, but this law was struck
down a month later by the Constitutional Court. Alan Riding, Polish Panel Rules
Police-File Disclosures Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, at A12.
228. An attempt to prosecute long-time President Jaruzelski was made in 1981
but with little apparent result. Stephan Engelberg, Jaruzelski Facing Accusers, Or Is
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questionable whether decommunization efforts will continue.' Cer-
tainly there is no doubt of this, particularly with the rather stunning
acquittals of General Wladyslaw Ciaston and General Zenon
Platek. 1 These two individuals had been charged with ordering the
1984 murder of Reverend Jerzy Popieluszko, an associate of the Soli-
darity movement. Despite the overwhelming testimony that led the
presiding judge to remark that the generals "were probably responsible
for the murder," 2 the acquittal was based on the fact that no cor-
roborating evidence could be obtained. The secret police had destroyed
the evidence in 1984.
In Hungary, Parliament's first attempt to remove the statute of
limitations on crimes committed during the communists' reign was
overturned by the country's newly created Constitutional Court.' In
response, the Hungarian Parliament passed a new law in February
1993 that retroactively extended the statute of limitations for crimes
committed during the 1956 uprising.' In October 1993, the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court upheld the main part of the Act.'
In addition to these legislative efforts, the Hungarian prosecutor's
office has initiated several "fact-finding" investigations into the crimes
committed under the old regime.2 36 Finally, in February 1993, the
government submitted a draft law to the parliament that would permit
action to be taken against informers and agents of the communist
regime." 7 Under this law, those who served in the intelligence de-
partment (known as 3/3), and those who served on squads that assist-
ed Soviet troops to quash the 1956 and 1957 rebellions, would not be
allowed to occupy senior public positions."
Like the other East European countries, Hungary has initiated a
reprivatization program, but with limited success.!3 Their program
230. Jane Perlez, Ex-Communists Get Crucial New Role in Polish Election, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al.
231. 2 Polish Generals Acquitted in Killing of Solidarity Priest, N.Y. TIMIS, Aug.
21, 1994, at A6.
232. Id.
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having struck down Parliament's first Compensation Law on the grounds that land
could not be treated differently than other forms of property.
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239. Karoly Okolicsanyi, Hungarian Compensation Programs Off to a Slow Start,
RFE/RL RES. REP., Mar. 12, 1993, at 49.
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to indemnify former political prisoners has been more successful, but
the $15 per month compensation is essentially symbolic in nature."
Two issues will dominate decommunization efforts in Hungary.
The first involves the arrests in the spring of 1994 of some of those
responsible - including Andras Hegedus, the former Hungarian Prime
Minister - for reprisal murders following the Soviet invasion in
1956.241 Juxtaposed alongside these efforts is the fact that former
communists now comprise a legislative majority.'2
Although there continues to be very little information emanating
from Albania, its Constitutional Court has struck down in its entirety
a "lustration law" that was aimed directly at advocates or private law-
yers.2 3 Whether this ruling is evidence of continued communist influ-
ence or whether the court was relying on more noteworthy judicial
principles remains to be seen. In addition, former Albanian President
Ramiz Alia and nine of his ranking officials were charged and convict-
ed of misappropriating state property and violating the rights and
freedoms of Albanian citizens,2"' despite little evidence of public in-
terest or enlightenment from the trial.2 "6
IV. EVALUATING DECOMMUNIZATION
Decommunization should have five major objectives: 1) to estab-
lish the truth about communist rule; 2) to in some way punish those
responsible for the most egregious crimes; 3) to create institutions that
will assist the process of democratization in the present and serve to
guard against the re-emergence of repression in the future; 4) to ac-
knowledge and compensate former victims; and 5) to begin the desper-
ately needed healing process in these societies.
A. Establishing the Truth
A foremost objective of decommunization should be to establish
the truth about the nature of communist rule publicly. The citizenry
needs to be made aware of the crimes of communist rule, the ideologi-
cal fixations that such regimes had, the means employed by communist
240. Celestine Bohlen, Victims of Hungary's Past Press for an Accounting, but
With Little Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at A3.
241. Jane Perlez, Hungarian Arrests Setting Off Debate: Should Oppressors of
1956 Be Punished?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at A6.
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BooKs, Aug. 11, 1994, at 33.
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governments to achieve their ends, and finally, who the masterminds
and key operatives behind the repression were.
Uncovering the truths of the nature of communist rule should not,
however, stop here. In addition, the new governments need to expose
the larger truths about the kind of "society" that communist rule creat-
ed. These were societies that made every citizen a victim and any
opposition was considered an enemy. Finally, these were societies in
which duplicity became a way of life.
How can this be achieved? The first step is to create a Truth Com-
mission representing the left and the right, the old order and the new.
The premium here is on public testimony provided by victims of the
old regime. As its name indicates, the purpose of a Truth Commission
would not be to prosecute but instead to attempt to distill the truth
and to present it to the public. Although it is important to look at the
actions of individuals, it is far more important to understand the inner
workings of the larger communist system of governance. As suggested
below, public trials also should have these objectives. In many re-
spects, however, this end will be easier to achieve through the vehicle
of a Truth Commission.
B. Punishing Masterminds and Egregious Human Rights Abusers
Along with the public acknowledgment that communist rule cor-
rupted virtually all aspects of society, the new governments also need
to prosecute individuals who bear the most responsibility for the atroc-
ities of the past. There are several things to note about such trials.
One of the stark lessons that emerges from the Argentine example is
that only the masterminds and the worst offenders should be brought
to trial.246 In addition, the period during which prosecutions are to be
brought should be limited. The new governments should also try to
establish at the outset who will be subject to prosecution, and who will
not be. Finally, no charges should be brought against subordinate
officials unless and until the masterminds of these same crimes have
been charged and convicted.
The new governments must also be aware of the symbolic nature
and truth-telling functions of these trials. While on one level these are
prosecutions against particular individuals for specific crimes, they
really are indictments against the communist system itself. Moreover,
such public trials should serve to bring about a greater understanding
of communist rule and of how society reacted to it. The trials to date
have been disappointing on all of these scores. Rather than using these
trials to illuminate the nature of communist rule and of the society it-
self, all too often the prosecution of former communist officials has
246. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537 (1991).
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degenerated into common and petty proceedings.2 7 In this respect
the model that could be followed are the trials of junta leaders in Ar-
gentina2 and Greece,"5 as well as the recent trial against former
Nazi collaborator Paul Touvier.250 In these cases, public trials of for-
mer national leaders served to greatly inform the public about the
crimes of the junta. Unfortunately, none of the trials that have oc-
curred in Eastern Europe to date has served either of these purposes.
Rather than prosecuting a wide range of communist officials, the
new governments should instead purge those whose behavior during
communist rule was "not what it should have been," to use the rough
standard employed by several countries that had been occupied by the
Nazis during World War II." This could occur in a variety of ways,
either through demotion or the loss of one's job, or the removal of cer-
tain civil, political, and economic rights, depending upon :.he circum-
stances. Because the questionable reports in secret police files will be
heavily relied upon, individuals should be given any benefit of the
doubt. In this process, it also is important to differentiate between
varying levels of complicity. As objectionable as collaboration with the
secret police is, it is different from being a member of the secret police.
It is vital to maintain this distinction. As a final point, the period for
which individuals are to be purged should not be onerously long. In-
stead, it should be long enough to make its point but not so long that
it serves as a festering wound that prevents all citizens from working
toward a better and more decent future.
C. Creating Institutions to Assist the Move to Democracy
Each country must implement measures to prevent a dictatorship
from coming to power again. The institutionalization of a parliamenta-
ry form of government is only one step in that direction. Another is the
creation of a truly independent judiciary and a Constitutional Court. It
is also vital that the former secret police apparatus be dismantled as
quickly and as thoroughly as possible.
Institution building in form is one thing; creating institutions that
function properly is a different matter. The mere "appearance" of de-
mocracy will not suffice. In this regard, lawyers, journalists, and politi-
cians have spent considerable time and energy providing assistance to
East European countries in terms of drafting constitutions and the
247. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
248. For a discussion of this, see supra note 153-54 and accompanying text.
249. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of this, see supra note 54. One of the most noteworthy
aspects of the Touvier trial was how it provided for a "day in court" for the victims
of French collaboration.
251. Vermeylen, supra note 44, at 77.
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like, giving far less time and attention to the actual functioning of
these newly created institutions and/or laws.
D. Acknowledging and Compensating Victims of the Old Older
Thus far, we have only been looking at punishing communist
officials and some collaborators. It is equally important for the new
governments to assist the victims of the old regime in whatever way
possible. One means of accomplishing this has been mentioned above:
to make a concerted effort to give voice to the victims' suffering, either
through the proceedings of a Truth Commission and/or in the course of
public trials. In addition, the new governments should make every
effort to enable the families of the victims to learn about the fate of
their loved ones, no matter when the events in question occurred. Tens
of thousands of individuals died at the hands of communist authorities,
yet far too little is known about the circumstances surrounding most of
these murders. Finally, each of the new governments ought to provide
some form of compensation or indemnification to those who suffered
the most from the old order. Given the poverty of the East European
countries, this will not be an easy task. On the other hand, there is no
reason why international lending institutions and foreign governments
could not assist in this process. 2 Furthermore, the new governments
have not been particularly aggressive in pursuing those who benefitted
economically under communist rule, an important source of funding for
restitution programs.
E. Understanding and Healing
The most essential task facing the new governments in Eastern
Europe is to assist the populations in these countries to understand
the insidious nature of communist rule. People must come to under-
stand how the former dictatorship was able to set person against per-
son and the state against all, under the guise of a new and more uni-
fied social order.
In closing, it would be well to heed the views of Czech author
Milan Kundera: "It seems to me that all over the world people nowa-
days prefer to judge rather than to understand, to answer rather than
to ask . . . ."2 What is needed in Eastern Europe, then, is much less
judgment and far fewer answers, and in their place, far more questions
and a much greater capacity for understanding.
252. For a further discussion of this, see Gibney, supra note 5.
253. Interview with Philip Roth, in MILAN KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER
AND FORGETTING (The Afterword) 237 (1980).
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